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MEN, WOMEN, AND OPTIMAL
VIOLENCE
Mary Anne Franks*
While both men and women can, and do, use violence against
each other, men's violence against women is far more common, less
justified, and more destructive than women's violence against men.
One of the reasons for this asymmetry is that men do not fear retalia-
tion for violence against women, whereas women do fear retaliation
for their use of violence against men. The distribution of violence be-
tween the genders, then, is suboptimal. Society would be better off as
a whole if more women were willing to engage in justified violence
against men, and fewer men were willing to engage in unjustified vio-
lence against women. To that end, women's justified violence against
men should be encouraged, protected, and publicized. This will re-
quire a reversal of the current trend in legal and social practices,
which is to tolerate and encourage men's unjustified violence against
women while discouraging and legally restricting women's violence
against men. Even if encouraging an increase in women's justified vi-
olence against men may sometimes result in unjustified or dispropor-
tionate violence in individual situations, the overall effects of the re-
distribution of violence will be preferable to the current asymmetry.
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. My thanks in particular to Darryl
Brown, Louise K. Davidson-Schmich, David Fagundes, E. Lea Johnston, Tom Lin, Joseph Parent,
Eric Posner, Christopher Slobogin, and Deborah Tuerkheimer for their insights, as well as to all the
participants in the University of Florida Junior Scholars Workshop and the New Voices in Legal The-
ory Workshop, who provided helpful feedback on early versions of this paper, and Clifford Friedman
for his research assistance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
While both men and women are capable of inflicting violence upon
the other, they do not do so in equal numbers or in equal ways. The dis-
tribution of cross-gender violence, and its consequences, is asymmetrical.
Men are far more likely, in general, to commit violence against women
than women are to commit violence against men, and the negative exter-
nalities of male violence against women are greater than women's vio-
lence against men. Men's use of violence against women is, broadly
speaking, more common, more severe, more harmful, and less justifiable
than women's violence against men. In addition to causing harm to indi-
vidual victims, men's violence against women creates net losses for socie-
ty as a whole. These include the diminishment of women's equal status
and participation in society, the economic costs of missed work days and
medical care, and harmful social and psychological effects on families.
While only a small number of men commit violence, men are the
perpetrators of most violent acts.' A significant subset of male violence is
directed at women. Some forms of violence or force, whether committed
1. Men are more than six times more likely to commit a violent crime than women. 86% of all
violent offenders are male. Men perpetrated 88.8% of all homicides in the U.S. between the years 1976
and 2005. ALEXIA COOPER & ERICA SMITH, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRODUCT No. NCJ 236018,
HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES (2011), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/htus8008.pdf.
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by men or by women, are sometimes necessary or at least justifiable, but
men's violence against women is generally neither. The majority of this
violence - domestic violence, rape, stalking, and sexual harassment - is
gratuitous, unjustifiable, and socially damaging. Unjustified male vio-
lence against women, and the fear of such violence, traps women in de-
structive relationships, forces them out of workplaces and schools, re-
stricts their freedom of movement, and undermines their sense of bodily
integrity. At the same time, they produce and sustain the message that
women are subordinate to men and that women's participation in society
is to be determined on men's terms.
If, as this Article assumes, fear of retaliation is one factor that inhib-
its violence, one reason for the asymmetry between men and women in
cross-gender violence is that men generally do not fear retaliation for en-
gaging in violence against women, while women do fear retaliation for
engaging in violence against men. Men may fear retaliation for engaging
in violence against other men, even if that violence is justified,2 but wom-
en rarely fight back against unjustified male violence, and the State does
little to fight on women's behalf. At the same time, women are often
punished by men or by the State for violence against men, even when
their violence is justified.
In other words, if we think of violence or force as a neutral quality
that can be used for good or ill, its current distribution in society is ineffi-
cient. An efficient or optimal level of violence in a society would be one
in which, broadly speaking, unjustified, antisocial uses of violence are
held in check by justified, pro-social uses of violence.
One uncontroversial, if simplistic, response to the violence "gender
gap" is for men to reduce their use of violence. Exactly how this reduc-
tion is to take place is a far more difficult question. One solution is for
the State to take men's unjustified violence more seriously, by reforming
legal and social practices to effectively describe, punish, and prevent
gendered violence. There is much to be said for this solution, and this
Article will attempt to contribute some insights to that project. This Arti-
cle rejects, however, the popular sentiment that reducing violence overall
should necessarily be the primary goal. Rather, we must countenance the
possibility that an increase in violence - of a very particular kind-may
be necessary.
Legal and social practices must be transformed to disrupt this
suboptimal status quo regarding violence, and this transformation should
include focusing on encouraging women's willingness and ability to en-
gage in responsive violence against men, as well as raising the visibility of
such responsive violence, in order to drive down the incidence of male
violence. To do this, we must reverse the current trend in legal and social
practices, which is to tolerate and encourage men's unjustified violence
2. See MARTHA MCCAUGHEY, REAL KNOCKOUTS: THE PHYSICAL FEMINISM OF WOMEN'S
SELF-DEFENSE 29 (1997) ("[T]he respect with which men approach other men surely has something to
do with the sense that there are consequences for treating a man disrespectfully.").
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against women while discouraging and legally restricting women's vio-
lence against men. Though raising women's level of violence necessarily
creates the potential for overreaction and abuse in individual cases, the
overall distributional effects will be preferable to the current asymmetry.
Despite the powerfully discriminatory and disciplinary effects of
male violence against women, the State generally fails to treat this subset
of male violence as a serious threat to women's equality and freedom.
While the letter of the law prohibits many of these acts, the State fails to
adequately invest in the enforcement of these prohibitions-for example,
by failing to address the vast underreporting of domestic violence and
sexual assault or to properly investigate the acts that are reported-and
grants perpetrators a spectrum of provocation or "heat of passion" de-
fenses to excuse or mitigate their actions. What is more, the legal defini-
tions of crimes against women are often underinclusive. The law contin-
ues to underestimate the harms of sexual assault, stalking, and
harassment and consequently defines them in inappropriately narrow
ways.
At the same time, the State strongly restricts women's responsive
violence to those acts. The law and social norms discourage female vic-
tims in particular from using violence to defend themselves. This
preemption and intolerance of women's private violence is not, as some
might argue, an inevitable consequence of the State's general monopoly
on legitimate violence,' given that men's private violence is by compari-
son frequently tolerated and in some cases encouraged by the State.
When the State refuses to exercise its monopoly on violence on behalf of
women, and both law and society tolerate private violence by men but
condemn it in women, female victims of crime are effectively left with no
way to respond to the violence committed against them individually, and
have no way to deter men's violence against women generally. So long as
the State is unwilling, and the victims unable, to respond to such vio-
lence, this status quo cannot be changed.
Men's disproportionate willingness and ability to use violence
against women must be countered, at least in part, by increasing women's
willingness and ability to use violence against men. This is in some ways
no more than a claim that women should enjoy an equally robust right to
self-defense that men have long enjoyed. Women must be encouraged to
respond to violence with proportional force. This is not merely a ques-
tion of justice but of social efficiency;' the more women make use of re-
sponsive, justified violence against men, the less men will make use of
unjustified violence against women.
3. See MAX WEBER, THE VOCATION LECrURES 33 (David Owen & Tracy B. Strong eds., Rod-
ney Livingstone trans., Hackett Publ'g Co. 2004).
4. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Efficiency and Individualism, 42 DUKE L.J. 53, 78 (1992) (examining
various definitions of social efficiency, including as the maximization of social welfare, "a definition
that can potentially serve both as a normative guide to conduct and as a way of describing events").
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More controversially, perhaps, this Article also argues that an in-
crease in women's violence and aggression must be tolerated even if such
violence violates traditional proportionality principles in individual in-
stances. However regrettable it may be that in individual cases some
women will overreact and perhaps even consciously exploit increased
tolerance of their use of violence, creating fear and uncertainty about the
possibility of women's retaliatory force serves the overall goal of redis-
tributing violence. Uncertainty about irrational or disproportionate re-
sponses has at least a modest inhibiting effect on men's use of violence
against other men; the same effect should obtain when women also pose
this threat. This solution is justified by the excessive and pernicious na-
ture of the status quo; the force necessary to disrupt social and legal de-
faults regarding men's violence against women may in some cases be ex-
treme, and individual instances of injustice may be more than
compensated by an overall shift in violence allocation. The more realistic
and salient the possibility of women's violent retaliation or preemption
of male violence becomes, the less male violence there will be.
This Article considers what can realistically be done, both legally
and socially, to encourage women's responsive violence, acknowledging
that such encouragement carries risks. Proposals to reform the legal con-
cept of self-defense (in particular eliminating the imminence requirement
to better reflect intimate partner violence), which have been made by
many feminist scholars, offer a promising start. It is also important to
identify and address women's lack of "violence literacy" relative to
men-the gender disparities in gun ownership, in martial arts, and in
sports-as well as their lack of "violence entitlement"-the different
ways men and women are taught to value their bodies, their personal
space, their sexuality, and their autonomy-relative to men.
Part II details law and society's indulgent approach to many forms
of unjustified male violence, both hierarchical male-on-male violence
(against racial and sexual minority men) and especially violence against
women. The monopoly of violence by the State is one that primarily
serves (certain) male interests, and men also dominate the practice of ex-
tralegal violence. Part III contrasts this to law and society's strong disap-
proval and restriction of violence by women, even when such violence is
justified. While the State's monopoly of violence is rarely used to protect
women's rights, legal and social norms militate against women's private
violence as well, placing women in a double bind. Part IV describes the
destructiveness of this status quo imbalance, emphasizing its physical,
economic, and expressive harms. Part V offers a descriptive and norma-
tive account of the possibilities of women's corrective violence to address
it. Part VI concludes.
No. 3] 933
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
II. TOLERANCE OF MALE VIOLENCE
James Messerschmidt has observed that while men commit the vast
majority of all forms of crime and violence, "the gendered content of
their legitimate and illegitimate behavior has been virtually ignored."' In
other words, the fact that violence is primarily a male phenomenon is
frequently taken for granted. This has obscured proper assessment of the
ways that violence serves masculine interests as well as helped to pathol-
ogize the violence of women as aberrant. While it is true that men make
up both the majority of victims of violence6 as well as the perpetrators of
violence -especially if one considers the vast machinery of violence in-
herent in the U.S. criminal justice system-the status quo allocation of
violence serves hegemonic male interests.! That is, the values at the top
of our current social and legal hierarchy require the subordination of
both women and racial and sexual minorities. The violence of men to-
wards other men is tolerated and encouraged so long as it is directed at
"subordinate" males, that is, men whose race, sexual orientation, and/or
economic status (or some combination of the three) earn them a lower
rank in the social hierarchy of masculinity, while the violence of men to-
wards women is not only tolerated, but also often encouraged as a means
of preserving social order.
A. Men's Violence Towards Other Men: Expanding Justifications for
Deadly Force
Legal and social norms surrounding the justifiable use of deadly
force highlight society's tolerance, and even encouragement, of male vio-
lence, especially hierarchical male violence exerted by more privileged
(by race, sexual orientation, and class) males against less privileged
males. Under traditional self-defense doctrine, a person can use force if
he reasonably believes such force is necessary to protect himself from
imminent use of unlawful force. Historically, such force must be limited
by the principle of proportionality. One should not use deadly force to
fend off a non-deadly attack. The "Duty to Retreat" doctrine emphasizes
the importance of avoiding deadly force: if a person can retreat in com-
plete safety from the dangerous situation, he must do so instead of using
deadly force. This duty to retreat has traditionally had one significant ex-
5. JAMES W. MESSERSCHMIDT, MASCULINITIES AND CRIME: CRITIQUE AND
RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF THEORY 1 (1993).
6. As McCaughey points out, "Men's violence against men ... even when sexual, is usually so-
cially recognized as violence whereas women are often blamed for precipitating, inviting, or deserving
men's violence against them." MCCAUGHEY, supra note 2, at 7.
7. See R. W. CONNELL, MASCULINmES 77 (2d ed. 2005) ("Hegemonic masculinity can be de-
fined as the configuration of gender practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the
problem of the legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant po-
sition of men and the subordination of women.").
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ception, known as the "castle doctrine," which holds that one has no duty
to retreat from one's own home.8
In recent years, however, there has been an observable trend away
from proportionality and restraint in the use of deadly force, and the cas-
tie doctrine has been greatly expanded in several states.' "Stand Your
Ground" laws, also sometimes referred to as "Line in the Sand" or "No
Duty to Retreat" laws, have been passed in thirty-three states, 0 many of
them modeled on Florida's Stand Your Ground statute, which was
passed in 2005.11
Florida's law includes several innovations that run contrary to tradi-
tional limitations on self-defense. First, it greatly expands the conception
of the "castle": one is allowed to use deadly force not only in homes, but
also in any "dwelling," which is expansively defined as "a building or
conveyance of any kind, including any attached porch, whether the build-
ing or conveyance is temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile,
which has a roof over it, including a tent, and is designed to be occupied
by people lodging therein at night,"1 2 as well as in occupied "vehicles."' 3
It also applies in "any other place where he or she has a right to be," 4 the
feature of the law that has attracted the most attention from the media
and the general public. According to the statute, any person who is not
engaged in unlawful activity in any such place "has no duty to retreat and
has the right to stand his or her ground and meet force with force, includ-
ing deadly force if he or she reasonably believes it is necessary to do so to
prevent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to
prevent the commission of a forcible felony."'- As I have noted else-
where, this particular formulation is not quite the radical break from his-
torical self-defense law that some critics have made it out to be.' 6 The du-
ty to retreat was commonly understood to only apply when a reasonable
person believed that he could retreat in complete safety-that is, without
risking death or great bodily harm.
That being said, two features of Florida's self-defense law arguably
do undermine the criminal law's historical discouragement of the use of
deadly force whenever possible. One is the inclusion of "to prevent the
commission of a forcible felony" as a legitimate grounds for deadly
8. But see JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE LAW: How THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REVOLUTION
IS TRANSFORMING PRIVACY 55-56 (2009).
9. See Mary Anne Franks, How Stand Your Ground Laws Hijacked Self Defense, in GUNS AND
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY: THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF FIREARMS AND FIREARM POLICY
(Glen H. Utter ed.).
10. AM. BAR Ass'N NAT'L TASK FORCE ON STAND YOUR GROUND LAWS, PRELIMINARY
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1, 10 (2014), http://www.abajoumal.com/files/GunReport.pdf.
11. FLA. STAT. § 776.013 (2015).
12. Id. § 776.013(5)(a).
13. Id. § 776.013(5)(c).
14. Id. § 776.013(3) (repealed, 2014).
15. Id. § 776.012(2) (repealed, 2014).
16. Mary Anne Franks, Real Men Advance, Real Women Retreat: Stand Your Ground, Battered
Women's Syndrome, and Violence as Male Privilege, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1099 (2014) [hereinafter
Franks, Real Men Advance].
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force." Given that forcible felonies under Florida law include crimes such
as robbery, this seems like an explicit endorsement of property over life,
which flies in the face of traditional self-defense jurisprudence. The sec-
ond troubling aspect of the law is its broad immunity provision for indi-
viduals who act in self-defense: "A person who uses force as permit-
ted ... is justified in using such conduct and is immune from criminal
prosecution and civil action for the use of such force . .. the term 'crimi-
nal prosecution' includes arresting, detaining in custody, and charging or
prosecuting the defendant."" Such immunity, by decreasing the likeli-
hood of arrest or prosecution of a person using deadly force, lowers the
transaction costs of using such force, which arguably makes the use of vi-
olence more appealing.
By preventing even the arrest or detainment of a person who has
used deadly force, this immunity provision effectively gives police offic-
ers the power to be judge, jury, and (non-) executioner in cases where
they believe an individual has acted in self-defense. While law enforce-
ment has always had considerable discretion with regard to who gets
charged and prosecuted in criminal cases, this immunity provision ap-
pears to transform that discretion into fiat. When Sanford Police Chief
Bill Lee faced public criticism for failing to arrest George Zimmerman
after he shot and killed an unarmed teenager named Trayvon Martin in
February 2012, he issued a statement claiming that the police were not
allowed to arrest Zimmerman given the immunity provision of Florida's
self-defense law:
When the Sanford Police Department arrived at the scene of the
incident, Mr. Zimmerman provided a statement claiming he acted
in self defens which at the time was supported by physical evidence
and testimony. By Florida Statute, law enforcement was
PROHIBITED from making an arrest based on the facts and cir-
cumstances they had at the time."
Clearly, Chief Lee believed that Florida law prohibited even the mere
investigation of a man found standing over the body of an unarmed teen-
ager he had just shot, simply because that man gave his word that he had
killed in self-defense.
After two months of public outcry, Zimmerman was charged with
second-degree murder for shooting Travyon Martin. Zimmerman
claimed at trial that Martin had attacked him, and that Zimmerman shot
Martin because he was in fear for his life and thought that Martin was
reaching for Zimmerman's gun.20 While Zimmerman ultimately did not
17. FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3).
18. Id. § 776.032(1).
19. Chief Bill Lee Answers Questions About Investigation into Shooting of 17-year-old Trayvon
Martin, SANFORD HERALD (Mar. 17, 2012, 2:59 PM), http://mysanfordherald.com/view/mobile-
full-story/17920337/article-Chief-Bill-Lee-answers-questions-about-investigation-into-shooting-of-17-
year-old-Trayvon-Martin.
20. In the aftermath of Martin's murder, it was frequently claimed that a person who initiates a
confrontation cannot claim self-defense. This is a misunderstanding of self-defense law generally, and
of Florida law in particular. While it is true, according to Section 776.041, "Use or threatened use of
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invoke the Stand Your Ground provision in his defense, language from
the Stand Your Ground provision was used in the instructions to the ju-
ry, and juror reports suggest that the provision did influence the jury's
decision to acquit Zimmerman. 21
If the Florida statute, at least as interpreted by police, provides such
a strong presumption of legitimate deadly force that an individual cannot
even be arrested (to say nothing of being charged) when he kills another
human being in a public place where both individuals had a right to be,
under circumstances that can most generously be described as ambigu-
ous, the law creates a very real incentive for men, in particular, to shoot
first and ask questions later.2 2 This was made explicitly clear in a Texas
Stand Your Ground case from 2007, where a man observing two men
burglarizing his neighbor's home told a 911 operator, "The laws have
been changed in this country since September the first, and you know it"
before he shot the two unarmed men in the back. Joe Horn was referring
to Texas' version of the Stand Your Ground law, which took effect on
force by aggressor," that the justification of the use of force "is not available to a person who . . .
[i]nitially provokes the use or threatened use of force against himself or herself," there are two signifi-
cant exceptions: "(a) Such force is so great that the person reasonably believes that he or she is in im-
minent danger of death or great bodily harm and that he or she has exhausted every reasonable means
to escape such danger other than the use of force which is likely to cause death or great bodily harm to
the assailant; or (b) In good faith, the person withdraws from physical contact with the assailant and
indicates clearly to the assailant that he or she desires to withdraw and terminate the use of force, but
the assailant continues or resumes the use of force." FLA. STAT. § 776.041. Even if Zimmerman initiat-
ed the confrontation with Martin (e.g. by demanding that he explain his presence), if Martin respond-
ed, as Zimmerman claimed, with violent force such that a reasonable person would believe he had no
other option than to use deadly force, such force would still be justified.
21. See Marc Caputo, Juror: We Talked Stand Your Ground Before Not-Guilty Zimmerman Ver-
dict, MIAMI HERALD, (July 16, 2013), http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/07/16/35024811juror-we-
talked-stand-your-ground.html; see also Franks, Real Men Advance, supra note 16, at 1117.
22. A recent national study of Stand Your Ground ("SYG") laws concluded that states with
SYG laws experience roughly 7% increase in their homicide rates, which translates into more than
seven victims per month. Interestingly, this study also found that this increase only applies to white
male homicide victims-the impact on the number of female or black victims was statistically insignifi-
cant. This picture changes, though, depending on what kind of SYG law a state has. The above figures
refer to states that have laws similar to Florida's-laws that not only strengthen the right to use deadly
force in the home, but anywhere a person has a right to be. In states that only increase the robustness
of the right to deadly force in the home, the number of female victims increases while the number of
male victims decreases. Chandler McClellan & Erdal Tekin, Stand Your Ground Laws and Homicides
3-39 (Inst. for the Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 6705, 2012). Both this study and another re-
cent study share the basic conclusion that SYG laws increase the net number of homicides and have no
appreciable deterrent effect on crime. Cheng Cheng & Mark Hoekstra, Does Strengthening Self-
Defense Law Deter Crime or Escalate Violence?: Evidence from Expansions to Castle Doctrine, 48 J.
HUM. RESOURCES 821, 849 (2013). Even more recently, Michael Dunn, a white man, fired into a vehi-
cle eight times after having an altercation with the vehicle's occupants over the volume of their music,
killing seventeen-year-old Jordan Davis. Dunn claims he thought he saw the youths inside the vehicle
point a shotgun at him, but there is no evidence that any of the teenagers had a weapon. Dunn's then-
defense lawyer, Robin Lemonidis, suggested that her client had a SYG defense because all Dunn
could see were "heavily tinted windows, which are up and the back windows which are down, and the
car has at had least four black men in it." Leigh Owens, Michael Dunn Claims Shotgun Was Wielded
Prompting His Shooting of Jordan Davis, HUFF. POST (Nov. 28, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2012/11/28/michael-dunn-claims-shotgon-wielded-_n-2207287.html. Dunn was eventually con-
victed of first-degree murder for the death of Davis, as well as three charges of attempted murder. See
Ray Sanchez, Man Gets Life Without Parole for Murdering Teen Over Loud Music, CNN (Oct. 17,
2014,4:29 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/17/justice/michael-dunn-sentencing/.
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September 1, 2007.23 The officer who arrived on the scene in time to see
Horn shoot both men in the back, and who did not dispute that he had
done so, did not arrest Horn. A grand jury was convened in Horn's case,
but no charges were brought against him.24 Horn was hailed as a "hero"
by many in Texas and elsewhere. 25
A recent American Bar Association report concluded that states
with Stand Your Ground laws experience overall increases in homicides,
and that racial bias plays a significant role in the inconsistent application
of the laws:
[T]he task force found that stand-your-ground laws carried an in-
herent bias against certain racial minorities due to cultural stereo-
types about those groups being more threatening or violent. The
task force found that in instances where a white shooter kills a black
victim, that homicide was 350 percent more likely to be ruled as jus-
tified than if a white shooter killed a white person.26
The day after the ABA report was released, police officer Darren Wilson
shot an unarmed black teenager, Michael Brown, at least six times after
Brown refused Wilson's order to move out of the street and on to the
sidewalk. This event set off intense protests in Ferguson, Missouri, where
the shooting took place. The shooting was only the most recent in a spate
of high-profile murders of unarmed young black men by police in recent
years,27 a stark contrast to law enforcement's remarkably bloodless re-
sponses to white men walking down public streets carrying shotguns,2
taking sniper positions against federal officers ,29 or engaged in mass
shootings."
Long before Michael Brown's killing or the official passage of Stand
Your Ground laws, however, the notorious case of Bernhard Goetz illus-
trated society's tolerance of violence against minority males in ambigu-
ous situations.31 In 1984, four young black men approached Goetz on a
New York subway train, one of them demanding, "Give me five dollars."
23. S.B. 378, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2007).
24. Adam B. Ellick, Grand Jury Clears Texan in the Killing of 2 Burglars, N.Y. TIMES (July 1,
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/us/Oltexas.html?_r=1&.
25. Brian Rogers et al., Joe Horn Cleared by Grand Jury in Pasadena, HOUS. CHRON. (June 30,
2008, 5:30 AM), http://www.chron.com/neighborhood/pasadena-news/article/Joe-Horn-cleared-by-
grand-jury-in-Pasadena-1587004.php.
26. Victor Li, States with Stand-Your-Ground Laws Have Seen an Increase in Homicides, Reports
Task Force, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 8, 2014, 9:40 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/stateswith_
standyour.ground laws_havemorehomicides/.
27. See Rich Juzwiak & Aleksander Chan, Unarmed People of Color Killed by Police, 1999-2014,
GAWKER (Dec. 8, 2014, 2:15 PM), http://gawker.com/unarmed-people-of-color-killed-by-police-1999-
2014-1666672349.
28. Tom Boggioni, Teen Totes Shotgun Through Town Still Shaken by Mass Murder to Support
2nd Amendment, RAW STORY (Aug. 3, 2014, 9:56 PM), http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2014/08/03/teen-
totes-shotgun-through-town-still-shaken-by-mass-murder-because-2nd-amendment/.
29. Bob Cesca, Two Americas: Ferguson, Missouri Versus the Bundy Ranch, Nevada, DAILY
BANTER (Aug. 14, 2014), http://thedailybanter.com/2014/08/two-americas-ferguson-missouri-versus-
bundy-ranch-nevadal.
30. Greg Howard, America is Not for Black People, DEADSPIN (Aug. 12, 2014, 8:52 PM), http://
theconcourse.deadspin.comlamerica-is-not-for-black-people-1620169913.
31. People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986).
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None of the teenagers, whose names were Barry Allen, Troy Canty, Dar-
rell Cabey, and James Ramseur, displayed any weapons. Goetz, who was
carrying an unlicensed .38 handgun loaded with five rounds, responded
by firing four shots, carefully aiming at each of the four men. He missed
his last target, Cabey. Upon realizing this, Goetz said to Cabey, "you
seem to be all right, here's another" and shot him again, severing his spi-
nal cord. Goetz then jumped on the train tracks and fled the scene.
In response to the charges of attempted murder and assault of the
four youths, Goetz claimed self-defense." Goetz testified that before any
of the men approached him, he knew that "they wanted to play with
me," despite the fact that he did not believe that any of the men had a
gun. Goetz claimed to have been injured in a mugging some years before,
and that this was when he had started carrying his illegal weapon.
Goetz's claim of self-defense was undermined-or should have been un-
dermined-by his startlingly candid account of his internal thoughts dur-
ing the incident." Before he started shooting, Goetz said, he planned out
his pattern of fire, stating that his intention in firing was to "murder [the
four youths], to hurt them, to make them suffer as much as possible"-
not to save his life or defend himself. 3 Goetz was nonetheless acquitted
of all charges except for possession of a concealed weapon. He was sen-
tenced to one year for this charge and served eight months."
In all three cases, the race of the victims played a significant role in
the perception of the threat they posed. Media coverage of the Goetz
case painted a picture of the four young men shot by Goetz as the kind of
animalistic thugs that were threatening the safety of New York. Much
was made of the fact that the men Horn killed were black illegal immi-
grants, suggesting that these characteristics somehow justified the shoot-
ings. Though the media coverage of Trayvon Martin's case was less one-
sided, efforts were made by both his defense team and by certain media
outlets to portray Martin as a drug-dealing hoodlum whom Zimmerman
could have reasonably thought was up to no good.3 6 The racial issues sur-
rounding Stand Your Ground laws are hard to ignore, especially in light
of the racial issues at play in other uses of (primarily male) force, e.g. po-
lice brutality.
These examples illustrate how men's violence against other men
tends to be tolerated, even encouraged, when the targets are perceived to
32. Id. at 46.
33. Id. at 44 (internal quotation marks omitted).
34. Id.
35. 2 ScOT P. JOHNSON, TRIALS OF THE CENTURY: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POPULAR CULTURE
AND THE LAW, 540 (2011). One of Goetz's victims, James Ramseur, was found dead as the result of an
apparent suicide on December 22, 2011, twenty-seven years to the day he was shot by Goetz. Goetz's
attorney, Darnay Hoffman, committed suicide in 2009. John Del Singnore, Man Shot by Bernhard
Goetz Found Dead After Apparent Suicide, GOTHAMIST (Dec. 23, 2011, 9:37 AM), http://gothamist.
com/2011/12/23/manshot-by-bernhard-goetz found-de.php.
36. Alexander Tepperman, Marijuana's "Dark Side": Drugs, Race, and the Criminilization of
Trayvon Martin, 2 (2013), available at http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005
&context=csrrr_events.
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be "lower-status" males. Such an attitude is evident not only in the use of
deadly force by both citizens and law enforcement against minority men,
but also in other contexts. The rampant sexual, physical, and psychologi-
cal abuse of men in prison is met with little or no institutional, social, and
legal response." It is not unusual to hear an unabashed assertion that
such men deserve these abuses because of the crimes they committed.38
In the military context, the sexual assault and harassment of soldiers per-
ceived as gay is given similar treatment." In these contexts, the indul-
gence of such male-on-male violence seems based in the belief that the
victims, by virtue of being lower on the male hierarchy because of race or
sexual orientation, deserve what they get. In that sense, men afforded
lower status in the hierarchy of male power are treated in ways similar to
women. 40
B. Men's Violence Towards Women: Encouraged and Indulged
Male-on-male violence is frequently marked by differences in race,
sexual orientation, and economic status between the perpetrator and the
victim. Male-on-female violence is also marked by all of these, but also,
of course, by gender differences. Male violence against women far out-
strips female violence against men, and the history of its use is not so
much one of subtle indulgence, but overt encouragement by both legal
and social forces.41
The doctrine of coverture, which maintained that a married woman
was "covered" by her husband under the law and thus lost most of her
own rights and responsibilities, included both a "right of chastisement"
and what would later come to be known as the "marital rape exemp-
tion." In other words, until the mid 19th century-and in the case of the
marital rape exemption, far into the 20th century-the law pointedly
granted men rights of violence against women. Such baldly stated legal
doctrines have largely disappeared from American law, but their influ-
ence remains. 42
As William Blackstone described it, "The husband ... (by the old
law) might give his wife moderate correction. For, as he is to answer for
37. See Rebecca Boone, Concerns Rise Over US Anti-Prison Rape Law's Fate, JUST DETENTION
(Jan. 5,2015), http://www.justdetention.org/en/jdinews/2015/01_05_15.aspx.
38. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO ESCAPE: MALE RAPE IN U.S. PRISONS (2001).
39. Men Sexually Assaulted in the Military Speak Out, MILITARYCOM (Dec. 20, 2013), http://
www.military.com/daily-news/2013/12/20/men-sexually-assaulted-in-the-military-speak-out.html (not-
ing also that the repeal of Don't Ask, Don't Tell has led to an increase in reports). One of the indirect
consequences of Don't Ask Don't Tell was that victims of same-sex sexual assault were discouraged
from reporting because it would lead to questions about their sexual orientation. Id.
40. See generally Mary Anne Franks, How to Feel Like a Woman, or, Why Punishment is a Drag,
61 UCLA L. REV. 566 (2014) (arguing, inter alia, that the use of feminization as punishment demon-
strates society's low valuation of women).
41. See Laurie J. Taylor, Comment, Provoked Reason in Men and Women: Heat-of-Passion
Manslaughter and Imperfect Self-Defense, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1679, 1680-81 (1986).
42. See, e.g., Maggie Cheu, Now and Then: How Coverture Ideology Informs the Rhetoric of
Abortion, 22 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 113 (2012).
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her misbehaviour, the law thought it reasonable to intrust him with the
power of restraining her, by domestic chastisement."43 This "old law" was
not overruled in American courts until the 1870s, and one might well
question how far they have come since then. In 1994, a Maryland truck
driver named Kenneth Peacock came home early and found his wife in
bed with another man. After chasing the man away, getting drunk, and
arguing with his wife, Peacock shot his wife in the head with a hunting
rifle. Peacock plead guilty to voluntary manslaughter, and was sentenced
to 18 months in prison. The judge who sentenced him, Robert E. Cahill,
expressed his regret that he had to give Peacock any prison time at all by
saying, "I seriously wonder how many men married five, four years
would have the strength to walk away without inflicting some corporal
punishment."" It is telling that Judge Cahill not only personally held this
view, but also felt comfortable announcing that view explicitly and pub-
licly as a reason for his ruling.45
Men are responsible for the majority of all forms of intimate partner
violence, including physical violence, sexual assault, and stalking." Men
kill women at much higher rates than women kill men, and their reasons
for doing so rarely have anything to do with self-defense.47 Men kill
women for sleeping with someone else," flirting with someone else,49 re-
fusing to continue a relationship, 0 refusing to begin a relationship,"' for
leaving home,5 2 for "nagging," 53 for insulting their manhood, 4 and the law
often responds with lenience in the form of provocation defenses that re-
duce murder charges to manslaughter and carry relatively light sentenc-
43. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 444 (1765).
44. Tamar Lewin, What Penalty for Killing in Passion? N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 1994), http://
www.nytimes.com/1994/10/21/us/what-penalty-for-a-killing-in-passion.html.
45. Following this case, Maryland legislators amended the law to exclude adultery as a sufficient
ground for a provocation defense. See Kimberly Wilmot-Weidman, After a 3-Year Fight, Murder is
Finally Murder in Maryland, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 23, 1997), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1997-11-
23/features/9711230114_- 1_- spousal-maryland-law-deadly-rage.
46. Across all forms of violence, the majority of female victims reported that the perpetrators
were male. Male rape victims and male victims of non-contact, unwanted sexual experiences reported
predominantly male perpetrators. Nearly half of male stalking victims also reported perpetration by a
male. Matthew J. Breiding et al., Prevalence and Characteristics of Sexual Violence, Stalking, and Inti-
mate Partner Violence Victimization-National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey, United
States, 2011, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROl (Sept. 5, 2014), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/
mmwrhtml/ss6308al.htm.
47. VIOLENCE POLICY CTR., WHEN MEN MURDER WOMEN: AN ANALYSIS OF 2010 HOMICIDE
DATA (2012), available at http://www.vpc.org/studies/wmmw2012.pdf.
48. See Donna K. Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who Batter Men Who Kill, 2 S.
CAL. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 71, 103-04 (1992).
49. Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106
YALE L. J. 1331, 1332-33 (1997).
50. See generally Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991).
51. People v. Casassa,404 N.E.2d 1310, 1312 (1980).
52. See Mahoney, supra note 49, at 6.
53. Police: Texas Man Kills Nagging Wife, WFMY NEWS 2, (July 7, 2012, 8:43 AM), http://www.
digtriad.com/news/local/story.aspx?storyid=235427.
54. Girouard v. State, 583 A.2d 718,719-20 (Md. 1991).
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es. 5 By contrast, women who kill men often do so in response to physical
beatings, rape, threats to themselves or their children, and rarely do so
for reasons of infidelity or relationship control-and the law often re-
sponds by refusing such women self-defense or provocation instruc-
tions.1 6
With regard to sexual assault, the marital rape exemption had two
non-mutually exclusive justifications: one, the fictive notion of "marital
unity"-if man and wife are one, then the one cannot be guilty of an out-
rage against the other. Of course, this "unity" really only worked in one
direction; women were not perceived as having the right to inflict vio-
lence (sexual or otherwise) upon their husbands. The other notion was
that of a woman's irrevocable sexual consent upon marriage: "the hus-
band cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife,
for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given
up herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract."" The
last state to remove its formal marital rape exemption was North Caroli-
na, which did so in 1993.8 Marital rape is still considered a lesser crime
than other forms of rape in most states."
Rape, whether within marriage or not, is both extremely common
and extremely under-punished. It is also a crime perpetrated mostly by
men against women.? According to a study by the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, there were nearly 1.3 million rapes of women in
the U.S. in 2010,61 nearly all of them committed by men.62 One in five
women will be raped in her lifetime; studies focusing on female college
students found that their odds of being raped are one in four. Rape is
55. See Nourse, supra note 48, at 1331; Emily L. Miller, (Wo)manslaughter: Voluntary Man-
slaughter, Gender, and the Model Penal Code, 50 EMORY L.J. 665 (2001).
56. Taylor, supra note 40, at 1719.
57. 1 SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 629 (Philadelphia,
Robert H. Small 1847).
58. THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, SPOUSAL RAPE LAWS: 20 YEARS LATER 1
(2004), available at http://www.njep-ipsacourse.org/PDFs/NCVCspousalrapelaws.pdf.
59. Id. at 3.
60. It is important to note, however, that recent research using updated (non gender-specific)
definitions of sexual assault and including previously omitted institutionalized populations (e.g. pris-
ons) indicates that there are far more male victims of sexual assault than previously believed.
61. NATIONAL CENTER FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL, NATIONAL INTIMATE
PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY: 2010 SUMMARY REPORT, at 18 (2010) [hereinafter NISVS
2010], http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/nisvs-report2l0-a.pdf (putting the number at
1,270,000). This figure is considerably higher than the number reported by the National Crime Victim-
ization Survey (NCVS), which counted 188,380 rapes in 2010. JENNIFER L. TRUMAN, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, PUB. No. 235508,2010 NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY (2011), available at http://
bjs.gov/contet/pub/pdf/cvlO.pdf. There is compelling evidence demonstrating that the NCVS's study is
badly flawed (including lack of privacy controls and a definition of rape that excludes incapacitation)
and thus the Centers for Disease Control study is far more accurate. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
ESTIMATING THE INCIDENCE OF RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT 71 (Candace Kruttschnitt et al. eds.,
2014).
62. 98.1% of perpetrators were male. Men also commit 93.3% of sexual violence against men.
See NISVS 2010, supra note 60, at 24.
63. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, Sexual Violence 1 (2012), available at https://www.cdc.gov/
violenceprevention/pdf/sv-datasheet-a.pdf; Bonnie S. Fisher et al., The Sexual Victimization of College
Women, DEP'T OF JUSTICE 10 (2000), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/182369.pdf. The
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also a very personal crime: the majority of men who rape know their vic-
tims," and 67% of women who are raped will be raped by her intimate
partner.6
Most of these sexual assaults never make it into official reports. The
vast majority of rapes-more than 80%-are never reported to police."
That is, the vast majority of rapists will never be so much as questioned
by police, to say nothing of being punished for their crime. The victims
that do report their rapes to police often face insensitivity, skepticism,
incompetence, and sometimes even outright hostility from law enforce-
ment. Recent research by Corey Yung persuasively demonstrates that
police departments around the country have been deliberately and sys-
tematically suppressing the number of reported rapes for more than a
decade.67 The laws of many states define rape in terms of presence of
force as opposed to absence of consent, erasing the crimes against victims
who cannot prove that their attackers used physical force beyond what
was necessary for sexual penetration.6 1
Despite the widespread belief that it is easy for women to "cry
rape" (going back at least 1680, when Sir Matthew Hale, Lord Chief Jus-
tice of England, claimed that rape is an accusation "easily to be made,
hard to be proved, and harder yet to be defended by the party accused,
tho' never so innocent . . . "69) many women face skepticism and even
hostility for reporting assaults. 0 Rape investigations can be humiliating,
invasive, and traumatizing; rape kits can take up to six hours to complete
and cause extreme discomfort and pain." A shockingly high number of
those rape kits will never even be analyzed; there are an estimated
400,000 untested rape kits in the Unitd States.72 While two-thirds of all
study estimated that between one in four and one in five college women experience completed or at-
tempted rape in their college years. Id.
64. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, PUB. No. 183781, FULL
REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN:
FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 46-47 (2000), available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/183781.pdf.
65. Id. at 43.
66. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 61, at 36 ("Conducted in 1989-1991, the National
Women's Study ... collected information on rape and sexual assault. It estimated that 84% of rape
victims did not report their victimization to police (Kilpatrick, Edmunds, and Seymour, 1992). Tjaden
and Thoennes (2006) reported a similar percentage (81%) of nonreporting from the National Violence
Against Women Survey.").
67. Yung estimates that as many as a million rapes have gone uncounted during this period.
"America is in a crisis of sexual violence that has gone undetected because police departments across
the country systemically underreport rape." Corey Rayburn Yung, How to Lie with Rape Statistics:
America's Hidden Rape Crisis, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1197, 1204 (2014).
68. JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW (5th ed. 2009).
69. 2 SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 606 (Philadelphia,
Robert H. Small 1847).
70. See Jill Smolowe, Too High a Price?, PEOPLE (Sept. 20, 2004), http://www.people.com/
people/archivearticle/0,,20145500,00.html.
71. Sexual Assault Information & Resources: Immediate Physical Safety and Medical Options,
WHEATON COLLEGE, http://wheatoncollege.edu/sexual-assault/home/frequently-asked-questions/
relationship-violence/ (last visited May 27, 2016).
72. Hillary Hylton, The Dark Side of Clearing America's Rape Kit Backlog, TIME MAG. (Sept. 7,
2013), http://nation.time.com/2013/09/07/the-dark-side-of-clearing-americas-rape-kit-backlog/.
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rapes are committed by someone the victim knows, 3 acquaintance rapes
are the least likely to be prosecuted and to yield convictions.7 4 Only 37%
of all reported rapes are prosecuted.75 The conviction rate for the tiny
number of cases that are actually reported, survive the skepticism and
hostility of law enforcement, are taken seriously by prosecutors, and fit
the narrow definition of rape used by most states, is 18%.76
Stalking and sexual harassment are also overwhelmingly perpetrat-
ed by men against women. One in six women will be stalked in her life-
time; 82.5% of perpetrators of stalking against women are men." Up to
80% of women have experienced street harassment,"7 which can include
sexual threats and groping, and is also perpetrated largely by men. Street
harassment's anonymous and often fleeting nature makes it difficult for
women to seek any redress, even in areas that have laws prohibiting such
conduct."
III. INTOLERANCE OF WOMEN'S VIOLENCE: A DOUBLE BIND
One might think that the contemporary expansion of self-defense
doctrine on the one hand, and the prevalence of men's violence against
women on the other would lead to the legal and social encouragement of
women defending themselves against the men who attack them. But the
opposite has occurred, providing strong evidence that violence is per-
ceived as the privilege of men to use even when the situation does not
justify it, a privilege denied to women even when the situation does justi-
fy it.
Stand Your Ground laws have greatly expanded the so-called castle
doctrine, which allows individuals to use deadly force in their own homes
even if they could safely retreat. The castle doctrine reflected the social
presumption that people should not be forced to retreat from their own
homes when under attack. But however well-suited the castle-doctrine
exception to the general duty to retreat may be for home invasions by
strangers, it is profoundly unresponsive to domestic violence situations,
in which victims and attackers share the same "castle." It is significant
73. TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 64, at 43.
74. Kathleen F. Cairney, Note, Addressing Acquaintance Rape: The New Direction of the Rape
Law Movement, 69 ST. JOHNS L. REv. 291, 299 (1995).
75. University of Kentucky Center for Research on Violence Against Women, Top Ten Things
Advocates Need to Know Series, RESEARCH TO PRACTICE BRIEF 1, 1 (Dec. 2011), available at http://
www.uky.edulCRVAW/filesfTopTen/07_Rape_Prosecution.pdf.
76. Id.
77. See NISVS 2010, supra note 61, at 29. Approximately one in nineteen men will be stalked in
their lifetime; of these, nearly half (44.3%) will be stalked by another male. Id.
78. Deborah M. Thompson, "The Woman in the Street:" Reclaiming the Public Space from Sexual
Harassment, 6 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 313, 314 (1994); see also STOP STREET HARASSMENT, Unsafe
and Harassed in Public Spaces: A National Street Harassment Report (2014), http://www.stopstreet
harassment.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/2014-National-SSH-Street-Harassment-Report.pdf (re-
porting that 57% of women had experienced street harassment) [hereinafter STOP STREET
HARASSMENT].
79. Thompson, supra note 78, at 335.
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that the castle doctrine is rarely cited as a response to, or preemption of,
the inevitable question asked of battered women: "Why didn't she
leave?"" The castle doctrine, were it not so thoroughly, though implicit-
ly, gendered, would provide a ready response, namely that "she" should
not have to leave her own home to avoid violence. The question, "Why
didn't she leave," reflects the very different ways that self-defense con-
cepts are applied to men and women. It is difficult to imagine asking a
man why he "didn't just leave" when someone broke into his house and
threatened him -so difficult, in fact, that the question is effectively fore-
closed by the castle doctrine. Yet, the question is routinely asked of
women who are attacked in their own homes.8 '
Thus, one way to correct the historical deficiencies of the castle doc-
trine would be to take domestic violence explicitly into account and re-
move its gendered presumptions. That, however, has not been the ap-
proach taken by Stand Your Ground proponents. Women using deadly
force against cohabitants still continue to be denied the protections of
the castle doctrine, and the expansion of the exception to retreat, which
is often referred to as the "true man rule," has lived up to its name.2
By removing the duty to retreat not just from confrontations inside
the home, but confrontations anywhere, Stand Your Ground laws are
hard to square with traditional conceptions of self-defense. Even more
significantly, those who agitate for and take advantage of Stand Your
Ground laws are primarily white, heterosexual men83 -the group that is,
objectively speaking, least likely to experience unjustified intrusions on
their liberty in public spaces. Women, along with racial and sexual mi-
nority men, experience far higher levels of public harassment than
straight, white men." As such, these groups have a far more compelling
claim to expanding the use of force in self-defense. Yet they are not the
groups clamoring for increased rights of to carry weapons or inflict seri-
ous injury, and in fact their use of violence is less likely to be indulged or
encouraged by law or society, as this section will detail.85
Domestic violence is a widespread phenomenon marked by gender
asymmetry. One in four women experience domestic violence in her life-
80. See Diane Rosenfeld, Why Doesn't He Leave? Restoring Liberty and Equality to Battered
Women, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAw 340 (Catherine MacKinnon & Reva Siegel
eds., 2003).
81. MCCAUGHEY, supra note 2, at 48 ("[T]he legal burden to retreat, as well as the 'true man'
exception to it, reinforce manly behavior in manly fights.").
82. Id.
83. Stand Your Ground laws are largely the brainchild of the National Rifle Association
("NRA"). While the NRA does not release membership demographics, its Board of Directors is 93%
white and 87% male. Dave Gilson, Meet the NRA's Board of Directors, MOTHER JONES (Jan. 16,2013,
6:06 AM), http://www.mothejones.com/politics/2013/01/nra-board-members-selleck-nugent.
84. For women and gay men, the harassment is frequently perpetrated by private citizens; for
black and Hispanic men, much harassment is perpetrated by law enforcement. See STOP STREET
HARASSMENT, supra note 78, at 14-15; NEW YORK CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, Stop and Frisk: Report on
2011 Findings, available at http://www.nyclu.org/files/stopandfrisk-factsheet.pdf.
85. See Franks, How Stand Your Ground Hijacked Self-Defense, supra note 9.
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time." Women account for 85% of all victims of intimate partner vio-
lence.Y In 2000, 1,247 women were killed by an intimate partner, com-
pared 440 men." In 2007, 45% of all murders of women are committed
by intimate partners, compared to 5% of all murders of men. 9 According
to at least one study, 60% of all restraining orders are violated, yet only
16% of violators are ever jailed." More than three women a day are
killed by domestic violence.91 Women in abusive relationships essentially
have two options: rely on the State to protect them, or engage in self-
help. Frequently, however, the State will not effectively intervene on
their behalf to stop the violence. This lack of response can range from
failure to enforce protective orders or to make arrests to lenient sentenc-
es for domestic abuse, thus failing to provide either deterrence or protec-
tion. When a battered woman, often precisely because of this lack of re-
sponse, resorts to the option of self-help, the State frequently metes out
harsh punishment."
To illustrate this double bind, let us consider the cases of Jessica
Lenahan and Judy Norman. Lenahan and Norman both faced extreme
and unjustified physical violence from men; Lenahan chose to rely on the
State to end the violence (behaving as a "good" battered woman should),
whereas Norman chose to engage in self-help (behaving as a "bad" bat-
tered woman).
A. Relying on the State for Protection: The "Good" Battered Woman
After Jessica Lenahan married Simon Gonzales in 1990, Simon be-
came increasingly abusive and violent. For several years, he beat and
sexually assaulted Jessica, and threatened to kidnap their children.93 Af-
ter Jessica separated from Simon in 1999, he stalked her at home and at
work. 94 Jessica obtained a temporary restraining order against Simon that
required him to stay at least 100 yards away from her and her home.95
She was told to keep the order with her at all times, and that the police
86. NISVS 2010, supra note 61, at 2.
87. Callie Marie Rennison, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, 1993-2001 1 (2003), available at
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdflipv01.pdf.
88. Id.
89. Shannon Catalano et al., FEMALE VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE 4 (2009), available at
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdflfvv.pdf.
90. Andrew R. Klein, Re-Abuse in a Population of Court-Restrained Male Batterers: Why Re-
straining Orders Don't Work 208, in Do ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK?.
91. Katie Sanders, CBS Sports'James Brown: 'More Than 3 Women Per Day' are Killed by Their
Partner, PUNDITFACT (Sept. 16, 2014, 4:40 PM), http://www.politifact.com/punditfact/statements/2014/
sep/16/james-brown/cbs-sports-james-brown-more-3-women-day-are-killed/.
92. See generally Leigh Goodmark, When is a Battered Woman Not a Battered Woman? When
She Fights Back, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 75 (2008).
93. Decl. of Jessica Roth Lenahan (Gonzales), at 1, 1 5-6, Gonzales v. United States & Colo-
rado, Case 12.626. Inter-Am. Comm'n on H.R., Report No. 52/07, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.130, doc. 22 (2007)
(Pet. No. P-1490-05).
94. Id. at 4, ¶1 12-13.
95. Id. at 4-5, 1 14.
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were required by law to arrest Simon if he violated it. 6 Accordingly,
when Simon broke into Jessica's house, changed her locks, and violated
the order in numerous other ways, Jessica informed the police. Their re-
sponse was to ignore her and, in some cases, scold her for bothering
them.'
A few months later, a judge made the restraining order permanent.
This order gave Jessica full custody of the three girls Jessica and Simon
had together, allowing Simon visitation on alternate weekends and one
prearranged dinner visit during the week.9 8 About three weeks later, Jes-
sica looked into her yard where her daughters had been playing and saw
that they were gone.9 Jessica called the police, telling them she thought
Simon had taken the girls. Since Simon had not prearranged a visit that
day, this would be a violation of the restraining order. She was told that
an officer would come to her house."1 After two hours went by and no
one came, Jessica called the police again. Two officers came to her house,
and Jessica showed them the restraining order. The officers told her,
"he's their father, it's okay for them to be with him."10 The officers told
her they couldn't do anything at that point, and told her to call back at
10:00 p.m. if the children had not returned.'" Shortly after the officers
left, Simon's girlfriend called Jessica to tell her that Simon had called her
and threatened to drive off a cliff. The girlfriend asked Jessica if he had a
gun and whether he might hurt the children.03
Jessica finally reached Simon on his cell around 8:30 p.m. that night.
Simon informed Jessica that he had taken the girls to an amusement park
forty minutes away in Denver." Jessica called the police immediately
with this information. She was told that there was nothing they could do
because Denver was out of their jurisdiction. Jessica pleaded with the po-
lice to issue a missing child alert or get in touch with the Denver police,
but they refused. One officer told Jessica that this was a matter for "di-
vorce court," and reassured Jessica "at least you know the children are
with their father." 0 Jessica continued to call the police repeatedly. At
10:00 p.m., the dispatcher scolded her for her continued calls.t" At mid-
96. Id. at 5-6, ¶ 16.
97. Id. at 9, ¶21.
98. Id. at 10, ¶ 23.
99. Id. at 15, ¶ 37.
100. Id. at 16, 1 39.
101. Jessica Gonzales' Statement Before the IACHR, ACLU (Mar. 2, 2007), https://www.
aclu.org/human-rights-womens-rights/jessica-gonzales-statement-iachr. The officer's response is an
example of the state disregarding, and thereby tacitly legitimizing, the violence that Simon Gonzales
had already inflicted against his ex-wife, as though such violence did not undermine Gonzales' rights
or capabilities as a father.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. Again, the police focused only on the fact that Gonzales was the children's biological par-
ent, ignoring his history of violence and the fact that he was, by taking the children, breaking the law at
that very moment.
106. Id.
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night, Jessica went to Simon's apartment, but he was not there. She
called the police again and was promised that an officer would come.
None did.1" Jessica drove to the police station to tell yet another officer
about the restraining order and that the children had been gone for seven
hours. This officer then left for a two-hour dinner and never contacted
Jessica again. In all, Jessica asked the police for help nine separate times
that night.'"
At some point in the evening after he had taken the girls, Simon
purchased a semi-automatic weapon.'" Why he was permitted to do this
despite a federal law prohibiting the sale of guns to individuals subject to
domestic violence restraining orders has never been made clear. At 3:20
a.m., Simon drove up to the Castle Rock Police Station and opened
fire."0 The police returned fire. When the shooting stopped, the bodies of
Jessica's three little girls were found inside Simon's truck."' Jessica heard
about the shooting from Simon's girlfriend, who called Jessica at 3:25
a.m. to say she thought the girls were dead.11 2 When Jessica rushed to the
station, the police refused to tell her whether the girls were alive or dead,
instead interrogating Jessica for twelve hours."'
Jessica filed a § 1983 claim against the Castle Rock police depart-
ment, arguing that the police had deprived her of her due process rights
by failing to enforce the restraining order."1 4 Relying in part on Deshaney
v. Winnebago,"' the Supreme Court ruled seven to two that citizens have
no personal entitlement under the due process clause to enforcement of
a restraining order."6 Deshaney held that a cause of action exists only if
the State illegitimately discriminates in providing its protection, or if the
State has a "special relationship" to the individual."7 The majority in
Castle Rock apparently did not think that failing to enforce protective
orders, which are most often taken out by women against men, constitut-
ed discrimination on the basis of gender; nor did it seem to think that the
State had created a "special relationship" with Jessica by issuing a pro-
tective order that purported to mandate arrest in the event of violation.
But Deshaney does not dictate such an outcome. In Deshaney, Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist wrote that "[t]he affirmative duty to, protect arises not
from the State's knowledge of the individual's predicament or from its
expressions of intent to help him, but from the limitation which it has im-
posed on his freedom to act on his own behalf.""' The Court cited as ex-
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748,749 (2005).
115. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
116. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 757.
117. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 119-200.
118. Id. at 200 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 2016948
MEN, WOMEN, AND OPTIMAL VIOLENCE
amples prisoners, involuntarily committed mental patients, and people
injured by police while in custody. What all of these groups have in
common is that they were involuntarily subjected to limitations on their
freedom by the State, and thus the State has a special obligation towards
them. But when the State promises, both in general social contract terms
via the monopoly on violence and (at least here) in the specific form of a
permanent restraining order with a mandatory arrest provision, that it
will act on behalf of a citizen facing a serious threat to herself or her chil-
dren, and then repeatedly fails to do so, has it not also imposed a limita-
tion on freedom?
Jessica, aided by (among others) the University of Miami School of
Law Human Rights Clinic, brought her case before the Inter-American
Commission of Human Rights."' The Commission issued a ruling in 2011
that stated:
The Commission has identified the duty of State parties to adopt
legal measures to prevent imminent acts of violence, as one side of
their obligation to ensure that victims can adequately and effective-
ly access judicial protection mechanisms. The Commission has iden-
tified restraining orders, and their adequate and effective enforce-
ment, among these legal measures. According to this principle, the
failures of the State in this case to adequately and effectively organ-
ize its apparatus to ensure the implementation of the restraining or-
der also violated the right to judicial protection of Jessica Lenahan
and Leslie, Katheryn and Rebecca Gonzales."'2 0
Unfortunately, this ruling has no direct effect on U.S. law.
Jessica Lenahan did everything a law-abiding woman is ostensibly
supposed to do. When her husband became physically violent, she left
him, even though he continued to threaten and stalk her. She sought and
received restraining orders, enlisting the lawful protection of the State
instead of attempting to meet private violence with private violence. By
issuing restraining orders that required police to arrest her ex-husband if
he violated their terms, and by a judge's assurances that this would in fact
be done, the State invited-in effect, forced-Jessica to rely solely on its
protection. Jessica forsook any option of private violence when she put
her faith in the legal system. Her reward was an utter failure of State ac-
tion, leaving her, in the end, to grieve over the dead bodies of her three
children.
B. Violent Self-Help: The "Bad" Battered Woman
We turn now to the case of Judy Norman. Over their twenty-year
relationship, John Thomas Norman, known as "J.T.," beat, raped, and
prostituted his wife, Judy, as well as threatened her repeatedly with muti-
119. Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) et al. v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R.,
Report No. 80/11, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.142, doc. 7 ¶ 1 (2011).
120. Id. at ¶ 117.
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lation and death, threatened her family and friends, and treated her liter-
ally like an animal, forcing her to bark like a dog and eat out of dog
bowls.12 ' Two days before the events that led to Judy Norman's arrest,
J.T. Norman was arrested for driving under the influence. When Judy's
mother bailed him out the next morning, he was angrier and more ag-
gressive than before. 122 He demanded that Judy make him a sandwich,
which he then threw on the floor. He demanded another, which he also
threw on the floor, and told her she needed to make one without touch-
ing it. He took this third sandwich, which Judy wrapped in paper towels,
and smeared it on her face. He then took Judy's cigarette and put it out
on her neck. Around 8:00 p.m. that evening, police responded to a do-
mestic call at the Norman residence. 123 Judy, whose face was bruised, told
the officers her husband had been beating her all day and that she could
not take it anymore. The officers told Judy to file a complaint, but Judy
expressed her fear that if she did so, her husband would kill her.124 The
officers left, only to be called back less than an hour later. Judy had swal-
lowed an entire bottle of pills and needed emergency assistance. Her
husband threatened to kill Judy's mother and grandmother upon discov-
ering what she had done. He tried to interfere with the paramedics, tell-
ing them to "[1]et the bitch die."12 ' Officers were finally able to chase her
husband into the house long enough to get Judy into an ambulance. Judy
spoke with a therapist that night about the possibility of charging her
husband and having him committed to a mental health center. She was
released in the middle of the night and stayed at her grandmother's
house. 1 26
The next day, Judy told her husband about the possibility of having
him committed, and he responded, "If you do, I'll see them coming and
before they get here, I'll cut your throat." 127 He made Judy drive him and
a friend to a nearby town, and began slapping her when he thought she
was following a truck too closely. He poured his beer over her head. At
one point he stretched out in the front seat as though he were going to
take a nap, and kicked her in the head. It was the third day he had not let
Judy eat any food. 1 28 Also that day, Judy's husband followed her to the
social services office and interrupted her attempt to get welfare benefits.
He threatened to kill and maim her, and beat her severely with his fists
and with other objects.'29 That evening, when Judy tried to lie down on
one of the two beds in their room, her husband told her she had to sleep
on the floor: "Dogs don't lay in the bed. They lay in the floor."130 Not
121. State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 10, 17 (N.C. 1989).
122. Id. at 10.
123. Id. at 19 (Martin, J., dissenting).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 10 (majority opinion).
127. Id. at 20 (Martin, J., dissenting).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 11 (majority opinion).
130. Id. at 20 (Martin, J., dissenting).
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long after this, the couple's daughter asked J.T. if Judy could watch her
baby. J.T. agreed and fell asleep. The baby started to cry, and Judy,
afraid that the noise would wake up J.T., crept out of her house and went
to her mother's.'3 ' While she was there, she asked her mother if she had
any pain pills, and her mother replied that she had some in her purse.
When Judy looked into the purse, she saw a gun in it.13 2 Judy took the
gun, went back to her house, and shot her sleeping husband three times
in the back of the head. 3 3
At trial, Judy requested a jury instruction of self-defense.'" Accord-
ing to common law, a person can use deadly force in self-defense only
when it is necessary, proportionate, and the danger is imminent.' The
Supreme Court of North Carolina overturned a lower court ruling that
had allowed Norman to receive a jury instruction on self-defense, hold-
ing that Norman did not have "a reasonable fear of imminent death or
great bodily injury."'3 According to the Court, Norman was "not faced
with an instantaneous choice between killing her husband or being killed
or seriously injured.... [Norman] had ample time and opportunity to re-
sort to other means of preventing further abuse by her husband." 7 It is
difficult to know what the Court meant by "other means," considering
the fact that J.T. had told her he would kill her before anyone would be
able to help her, that he had made threats against her family, that J.T.'s
previous stint in jail had left him angrier and even more violent, and that
the police had never even bothered to show up after Norman's mother
had called the police before the shooting took place. 3 1
The Court was clearly alarmed by the prospect of battered wives
seeking violent retaliation: to grant Norman an instruction on self-
defense, it claimed,
would tend to categorically legalize the opportune killing of abusive
husbands by their wives solely on the basis of the wives' testimony
concerning their subjective speculation as to the probability of fu-
ture felonious assaults by their husbands. Homicidal self-help would
then become a lawful solution, and perhaps the easiest and most ef-
fective solution, to this problem." 39
As the dissent observed, however, it is possible for any self-defense claim
to be misused. There was no reason to single out self-defense claims by
battered spouses, as they are not unique in allowing for the possibility of
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 13 (majority opinion).
134. Id. at 9.
135. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 500-07 (5th ed.
2009).
136. Norman, 378 S.E.2d at 9.
137. Id. at 13.
138. Id. at 10, 13; see also id. at 19-20 (Martin, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 15 (majority opinion). Though the Court obviously wished to sound a cautionary note
in claiming that homicidal help would become the "easiest and most effective solution" to the problem
of severe and prolonged domestic abuse, one way of stating my argument is to say that this claim is
exactly right-not only descriptively, but normatively. Id.
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the "peril of fabricated evidence."'4 Even more to the point, the dissent-
ing judge noted that the record in Norman's case "contain[ed] no rea-
sonable basis to attack the credibility of evidence for the defendant."1 4 1
The outcome of State v. Norman is shocking in itself; it is all the
more so compared to People v. Goetz, discussed above. Recall that in
Goetz, a man who tried to kill four young men he had never met before,
but somehow "knew" were dangerous to him, was granted a self-defense
instruction and acquitted of all attempted murder and assault charges. In
Norman, a woman who shot the man that had terrorized, beaten, prosti-
tuted, and threatened her for twenty years was denied a jury instruction
on self-defense and convicted of voluntary manslaughter.'42 When men
use deadly force against lower-status men based on no more than specu-
lation that they might pose a threat, the State accommodates this vio-
lence; when women uses deadly force against men who have actually and
repeatedly committed violence against them, the State condemns this vi-
olence.
C. Can Women Stand Their Ground?
As detailed above, legal and social norms are shifting towards an
expanded vision of justifiable deadly force, but this emerging indulgence
of violence seems to be primarily reserved for men, and primarily for
men at the top of the race and class hierarchy. Stand Your Ground laws
ostensibly strengthen citizens' rights to protect themselves both in public
and in the home: Florida's law, for instance, adds certain presumptions of
reasonableness to confrontations occurring inside the home. One might
reasonably surmise that such laws might in part be aimed at correcting
the imbalance just described, wherein battered spouses (mostly women)
who resort to deadly force against their abusive partners are treated
more harshly than people (mostly men) who use preemptive violence
against strangers.
The case of Marissa Alexander, a Florida Stand Your Ground case
that received far less attention than George Zimmerman's, casts this
proposition into serious doubt.1 43
Marissa Alexander, an African-American mother of three, was es-
tranged from her husband, Rico Gray, who had been abusive towards
140. Id. at 16 (Martin, J., dissenting).
141. Id. Norman's sentence was ultimately commuted to time served by the governor of North
Carolina. Sentence Commuted, TIMES-NEws, July 8, 1989, at 5, available at http://news.google.
com/newspapers?nid=1665&dat=19890708&id=mKIbAAAAIBAJ&sjid=RO4EAAAAIBAJ&pg=534
6,1536168.
142. These two cases often appear back-to-back in criminal law casebooks, with accompanying
notes implying that those who think Norman should have received an instruction on self-defense must
support the outcome in Goetz-a misleading implication, if not an outright false equivalence.
143. For a more detailed analysis of the Marissa Alexander case, see Franks, Real Men Advance,
supra note 16, at 1118-19.
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Alexander during their relationship.'" Gray had been arrested twice be-
fore on misdemeanor charges of domestic battery, and Alexander had
once obtained a protection order against him."' On August 1, 2010, a few
days after giving birth to a child fathered by Gray, Alexander invited
Gray to her home to see pictures of their child on her cell phone.14 Gray
had brought his son with him, and the interaction was amicable until Al-
exander got up to use the bathroom and Gray began looking at text mes-
sages on her phone. Upon finding some messages from Alexander's ex-
husband, Gray flew into a rage. 1 47 The two fought, and Alexander told
Gray to leave. He refused, and Alexander tried to leave through the gar-
age. Upon realizing that the door would not open, Alexander returned to
the kitchen with the lawfully possessed gun she had left her truck.148 Ac-
cording to Alexander, Gray threatened her life upon her return, and she
fired a shot into the ceiling to scare Gray into leaving. In a sworn deposi-
tion, Gray himself confirmed that Alexander's version of what happened
was true, though he later retracted this.14 9
After Gray left the house, he called the police, who arrested Alex-
ander immediately arrested upon arrival at her home.5 0 Though her hus-
band admitted that he had threatened Alexander and the shot harmed
no one, Alexander was denied Stand Your Ground immunity."' At her
first trial, she was convicted of three counts of aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon (her husband's two sons were in the home at the time of
the shooting) and sentenced to twenty years."' Alexander was granted a
new trial because of erroneous jury instructions, but was once again de-
nied Stand Your Ground immunity."' Alexander eventually agreed to a
plea deal that would allowed her to be released in January 2015, by
which point she had spent 1,095 days in prison.15 4
144. Mitch Stacy, Marissa Alexander Gets 20 Years for Firing Warning Shot (VIDEO),
HUFFINGTON PosT (May 19, 2012, 4:31 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/19/marissa-
alexander-gets-20_n_1530035.html.
145. Franks, Real Men Advance, supra note 16, at 1118.
146. Deposition of Rico Gray at 15, State v. Alexander, No. 2010-CF-8579 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 22,
2010).
147. Id. at 12-16.
148. Id. at 27-28.
149. Irin Carmon, Can Women Stand Their Ground? Depends on the Target, MSNBC (Mar. 20,
2014, 3:05 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/can-women-stand-their-ground.
150. Kirsten Powers, Prosecuted for Standing Her Ground, DAILY BEAST (July 19, 2013, 4:45
AM), http://www.thedailybeast.comlarticles/2013/07/19/angela-corey-s-overzealous-prosecution-of-
marissa-alexander.html.
151. Irin Carmon, Marissa Alexander Denied New Stand Your Ground Hearing, MSNBC (Jan. 27,
2015, 11:52 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/marissa-alexander-denied-new-stand-your-ground-
hearing.
152. Steven Nelson, Marissa Alexander Now Faces 60 Years for 'Warning Shot' at Abusive Hus-
band, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Mar. 3, 2014, 1:11 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/
2014/03/03/marissa-alexander-now-faces-60-years-for-warning-shot-at-abusive-husband.
153. Angela Corey, the prosecutor in Alexander's case-the same prosecutor as in Zimmerman's
case-has announced her intention to have Alexander's sentence increased to sixty years (twenty
years for each of the counts to be served consecutively instead of concurrently). See id.
154. Marissa Alexander Out of Jail After Plea Deal in Warning Shot Case, BAY NEWS 9 (Jan. 28,
2015, 9:37 AM), http://www.baynews9.com/content/news/baynews9/news/article.html/content/news/
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The privilege of self-defense is denied to women not only when they
are in their own homes but also when the person against whom force is
used is a known and credible threat. It is denied even when the force
used does not result in death or even injury. Jessica Lenahan attempted
to respond to her situation through reliance on the law; after recognizing
the indifference and futility of law enforcement efforts, Judy Norman fi-
nally took matters into her own hands. The law punished both of them-
in Lenahan's case by its refusal to exercise the force it had promised her
and on which she had relied, and in Norman's case by punishing her for
using her own force. Similarly, Marissa Alexander was initially sentenced
to twenty years in prison for firing warning shots to ward off the man
who was trying to strangle her, while George Zimmerman, who shot an
unarmed black teenager at point blank, was acquitted of any wrongdo-
ing.
These cases illustrate the double bind in which victims of male vio-
lence are caught: they are denied the State's violence on their behalf, and
they are prohibited from using their own violence. How is a female vic-
tim to be empowered under such conditions, and how is a violent male to
be deterred?
IV. THE COSTS OF VIOLENCE
Violence can be justified or unjustified, socially beneficial or socially
harmful, efficient or inefficient. Male violence towards women is, in the
main, unjustified, socially harmful, and inefficient. These three character-
istics are interrelated and mutually reinforcing.
The most compelling justification for violence is defense of self or
others. The fact that the vast majority of male violence against women is
not premised on any threat to men's physical wellbeing is significant.
Male violence against women is rarely used in response to women's use
of force."' Nor can male violence against women generally be explained,
to say nothing of justified, as mutual combat,' 5 6 protection of property, or
what is known in criminal law as "imperfect self-defense." Imperfect self-
defense is a common law defense available to defendants who use force
in the honest but mistaken belief that it was necessary."'5 When we con-
articles/cfn/2015/1/28/marissaalexander.html (stating that the plea agreement includes two years of
house arrest).
155. While men certainly are sometimes victims of women's violence (and perhaps far more often
than statistics can yet tell us, given the stigma that accompanies such an admission), statistically speak-
ing men are overwhelmingly likely to be the instigators of violence against women rather than the oth-
er way around. But see Joan Arehart-Treichel, Men Shouldn't Be Overlooked as Victims of Partner
Violence, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS (Aug. 3, 2007), http://psychnews.psychiatryonline.org/doi/full/10.1176%
2Fpn.42.15.0031a ("In fact, when it comes to nonreciprocal violence between intimate partners, wom-
en are more often the perpetrators.").
156. With the exception of some small percentage of domestic violence situations. But see id.
("Although more men than women (53% versus 49%) had experienced nonreciprocal violent relation-
ships, more women than men (52% versus 47%) had taken part in ones involving reciprocal vio-
lence.").
157. See CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN, 134 (2003).
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sider the principal forms of men's violence against women-domestic
battering, sexual assault, stalking, and sexual harassment-it is clear that
such violence is for the most part both gratuitous and unilateral.
Men's violence against women imposes significant costs on victims.
The spectrum of male aggression towards women causes an array of neg-
ative consequences. Domestic violence can cost victims their jobs, their
financial stability, their children, their family and social support systems,
and their lives. The trauma of sexual assault can last a lifetime, under-
mining victims' ability to work, receive an education, and form and main-
tain intimate relationships. Stalking victims often live their whole lives in
fear, never knowing when their stalker might reappear or what he may
do when he does. Many stalking victims have to relocate, change jobs, or
even change their names to try to elude their abusers. Street harassment
provokes fear, anger, and discomfort in women,'s which restricts their
personal liberties (including their choice of what to wear and when and
where to walk) and undermines their sense of safety and right to access
public spaces.'
These injuries are not limited to the victims themselves. Violent
men often also target victims' children, family members, friends, peers,
and intimate partners. Men who kill their partners, or ex-partners, not
infrequently also kill or injure the co-workers or family members. The
psychological effect on children, other family members, and bystanders
forced to witness violence is another significant cost. Studies show that
children who witness domestic violence suffer a range of psychological
and developmental problems, and that growing up in a violent home is
the "single best predictor of children becoming either perpetrators or vic-
tims of domestic violence later in life."'16
These forms of violence also cause serious economic costs: health
care expenses, legal expenses, law enforcement and court resources, lost
wages, lost labor, lost parenting hours, and lost productivity. According
to a 2003 study on Intimate Partner Violnce ("IPV") by the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention,
The costs of intimate partner rape, physical assault, and stalking ex-
ceed $5.8 billion each year, nearly $4.1 billion of which is for direct
medical and mental health care services. The total costs of also in-
158. See STOP STREET HARASSMENT, supra note 78, at 6, 10.
159. See Cynthia Grant Bowman, Street Harassment and the Informal Ghettoization of Women,
106 HARV. L. REv. 517, 542 (1993) ("[T]he continuation and near-general tolerance of street harass-
ment has serious consequences both for women and for society at large. It inflicts the most direct costs
upon women, in the form of fear, emotional distress, feelings of disempowerment, and significant limi-
tations upon their liberty, mobility, and hopes for equality. It also increases distrust between men and
women and reinforces rigid gender roles, hierarchy, and the confinement of women to the private
sphere. Street harassment thus performs a function as a social institution that is antithetical to the ac-
ceptance of women into American public life on terms equal to men."); Olatokunbo Olukemi Laniya,
Street Smut: Gender, Media, and the Legal Power Dynamics of Street Harassment, or 'Hey Sexy' and
Other Verbal Ejaculations, 14 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 91 (2005).
160. See UNICEF, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: THE IMPACT OF DOMEsTIC VIOLENCE ON
CHILDREN 7 (2006), available at http://www.unicef.org/protection/files/BehindClosedDoors.pdf.
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clude nearly $0.9 billion in lost productivity from paid work and
household chores for victims of nonfatal IPV and $0.9 billion in life-
time earnings lost by victims of IPV homicide. The largest propor-
tion of the costs is derived from physical assault victimization be-
cause that type of IPV is the most prevalent. The largest component
of IPV-related costs is health care, which accounts for more than
two-thirds of the total costs.16 '
Individual economic costs are furthermore often part of a vicious cycle:
the fewer financial resources a woman has, the fewer options she has to
exit an abusive relationship.
All of these costs also sustain and exacerbate gender inequality. Vi-
olence, especially ongoing violence, renders victims less competitive in
every sense. The experience or anticipation of violence traps women in
destructive relationships, restricts their freedom of movement, inhibits
their performance in workplaces and schools, and drives many women
away from certain jobs, opportunities, and spaces altogether. Male vio-
lence towards women promotes toxic presumptions of male superiority,
sexual entitlement, and female subordination. Domestic violence, rape,
stalking, and sexual harassment communicate harmful expressive mes-
sagesl62 about women's subordination to men.
Yet instead of correcting this monstrously unjust and destructive
status quo, the majority of legal and social norms support and perpetuate
it. Violence against women is routinely treated as though it were natural,
deserved, or trivial, or some combination of the three. Far from restrain-
ing male violence against women, the law indulges it through a lack of
formal legal prohibition of many of its forms (e.g. street harassment,
online harassment, many forms of sexual assault and reproductive inter-
ference)163 under-investigation and under-prosecution of the crimes that
do exist (e.g. rape kit backlog'" and longstanding "arrest avoidance" in
domestic violence cases),16' and the infrequent and/or lax punishment of
perpetrators that are brought before a court (e.g. excuse defenses based
161. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., COSTS OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2003), available at http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/
ipvbook-a.pdf. It is significant to note that these are not even the sum total of all unjustified male vio-
lence against women, but only an assessment of violence perpetrated by intimate partners.
162. See Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Re-
statement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1525 (2000) ("[E]xpressive meanings are public constructions. It is
not that the public interpretation is infallible or definitive of what a practice means, but that a pro-
posed interpretation must make sense in light of the community's other practices, its history, and
shared meanings.").
163. See discussion supra Part II; see also Duncan Kennedy, Sexual Abuse, Sexy Dressing and the
Eroticization of Domination, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1309, 1314-20 (1992) (describing the "tolerated
residuum" of sexual abuse and its consequences).
164. See Bill Piper, Thousands of Rapists Are Not Behind Bars Because Cops Focus on Marijuana
Users, HUFFINGTON POST (June 17, 2014, 3:18 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bill-piper/rape-kit-
backlogb_5504287.html.
165. Martin L. O'Connor, From Arrest Avoidance to Mandatory Arrest: Some Historic, Social, and
Legal Forces that Have Shaped Police Spouse Abuse Policies in the United States, in WOMEN AND
JUSTICE 165-85 (Roslyn Muraskin, ed., 1999).
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on the "provocative" actions of women)." Men who kill, rape, and har-
ass women are granted a wide range of cover for their actions.
At the same time, as discussed above, the law condemns and re-
stricts women's use of violence, so that women are discouraged from en-
gaging in responsive violence that could also serve to deter future vio-
lence against them.167 The overuse and tolerance of unjustified male vio-
violence, and the corresponding underuse and intolerance of justified
female violence, sends an expressive message to the victims as well as to
society as a whole. That message is, first, that using force to discipline
women as punishment for exerting autonomy is acceptable.''6 When
women are targeted for male violence because they end or refuse to en-
ter relationships, or do not behave in the way that their controlling part-
ners think they should behave, they are being punished for exercising in-
timate or other personal choices. When the response to sexual assault so
often involves no examination of the choices made by the perpetrators,
but rather focusing on the victims' conduct-what she was wearing,
whether she flirted, if she was drinking, where she walked-it sends the
message that women must sacrifice their liberty to avoid being victim-
ized, despite the fact that there is no evidence that such measures will ac-
tually reduce their chances of being assaulted. When men aggressively
sexualize women who walk past them on the street or enter a bar or work
in the next office, they send the message that women shouldn't be in
those places, or at least that non-consensual sexualization is the price
they must pay for being in those places.16 9 Killings, beatings, rapes, and
harassment all send the message that women must be kept in their place,
and the law's lack of effective response to this violence suggests the
State's tacit approval of this message.' The men who perpetrate vio-
lence against women have no reason to fear or any incentive to change
their behavior: women rarely fight back, and the State will not fight for
them.
V. FIGHTING BACK: ENCOURAGING WOMEN'S RESPONSIVE VIOLENCE
This radically unequal, unjust, and suboptimal state of affairs cannot
be adequately addressed with platitudes bemoaning violence generally
and calling for its overall reduction. Violence is not a general phenome-
non, and it is certainly not a gender-neutral one. Violence is not neces-
166. See discussion supra Part IV.
167. See MCCAUGHEY, supra note 2, at 3-4 ("Women's uses of weapons and their own bodies for
self-defense are publicly scrutinized in a way that husbands . .. are not-probably because they injure
men, and because they provide women with greater autonomy while restricting men's behavior, rather
than the opposite.").
168. See Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique
of Feminist Legal Theory, 15 WIs. WOMEN's L.J. 149, 189 (2000).
169. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 40 (1979).
170. See Danielle Keats Citron, Law's Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender Harassment,
108 MICH. L. REV. 373, 375 (2009); Mary Anne Franks, Sexual Harassment 2.0, 71 MD. L. REV. 655
(2012).
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sarily negative, and it in fact can serve beneficial ends. If men's unjusti-
fied violence towards women is a problem, then it is this particular vio-
lence-not violence in general-that must be reduced. It is reasonable to
assume women's infliction of responsive violence against men, or at least
the credible threat of such violence, can reduce men's unjustified vio-
lence. If that is the case, we should not condemn women's responsive vio-
lence. In fact, we should celebrate it, encourage it, and increase its visibil-
ity.
Focusing on increasing women's justified, responsive violence is of
course not the only way to reduce men's violence against women. An-
other approach that many scholars have advanced is for the State to take
men's unjustified violence more seriously, reforming legal and social
practices to effectively describe, punish, and prevent gendered violence.
This is an important and valuable effort. The approach urged in this Ar-
ticle is by no means meant to be exclusive. The encouragement of wom-
en's violence can and should occur alongside legal and institutional
change.
This Article does insist that more dramatic and immediate changes
will be necessary to truly disrupt the status quo, and that a pragmatic, ef-
ficiency-based approach to violence is key to this disruption. Violence
can and should be put in the service of justice when other means prove to
be ineffective. One reason powerful groups are willing and able to inflict
unjust violence against less powerful groups is that they do not fear retal-
iation. For example, while legal reform and evolving social mores did
much to advance the cause of civil rights, the willingness and ability of
black people to use violence when necessary also played a key role.'^ If
men will not refrain from the use of unjust violence against women, and
the State refuses to restrain them, then women themselves must be
equipped to prevent and preempt this violence.
To move the use of violence between men and women closer to op-
timal level, women must increase their willingness and ability to use vio-
lence against men. The goal here is not only justice, but social efficien-
cy:17 2 the more responsive, justified violence women use against men, the
less unjustified violence men will use against women. In some respects,
this proposition should be non-controversial; women should be able to
enjoy the same robust right to self-defense as men, encouraged and pro-
tected when they use proportional force in response to credible threats.
The more controversial aspect of the approach is that law and socie-
ty should be willing to tolerate, though not encourage, even dispropor-
tionate uses of violence by women against men. That more force than is
strictly necessary may sometimes be used in individual confrontations is
171. See generally CHARLES E. COBB JR., THIS NONVIOLENT STUFF'LL GET You KILLED: How
GUNS MADE THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT POSSIBLE (2014).
172. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Efficiency and Individualism, 42 DUKE L. J.53,78 (1992) (examining
various definitions of social efficiency, including as the "maximization of social welfare, a definition
that can potentially serve both as a normative guide to conduct and as a way of describing events.").
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regrettable, but inevitable. The law currently makes room for such mis-
takes through doctrines such as imperfect self-defense and, more recent-
ly, by codifying enlarged presumptions in self-defense doctrine through
Stand Your Ground laws. This indulgence currently redounds primarily
to the benefit of men. If women's responsive violence against men is in-
creased, this gender asymmetry will shift. However regrettable it may be
that in individual cases some women will overreact, and even consciously
exploit increased tolerance of their use of violence, there is a benefit
even to this excess. This redistribution of violence will create fear and
uncertainty about the possibility of women's retaliatory force, which will
inhibit men's general use of violence against women. Uncertainty about
irrational or disproportionate responses has an inhibiting effect on men's
use of violence against other men. The same effect should obtain when
women also pose this threat. The extreme asymmetries of violence in the
status quo justify this result; the force necessary to disrupt social and le-
gal defaults regarding men's violence against women may in many cases
be extreme.
Accordingly, the discussion below will consider what can realistical-
ly be done both legally and socially to encourage women's ability and
willingness to use responsive violence, while acknowledging that such en-
couragement carries risks. In addition to current proposals by many do-
mestic violence scholars to reform the legal concept of self-defense (in
particular eliminating or reforming the imminence requirement to better
reflect intimate partner violence),"' we must identify and address the
"gender gap" in both "violence literacy"-the gender disparities in gun
ownership, martial arts, and in sports-and "violence entitlement" -the
different ways men and women are taught to value their bodies, their
personal space, their sexuality, and their autonomy. Closing this gap may
well lead to overreactions in individual interactions between men and
women, but even these inefficiencies should be tolerated for the benefi-
cial inhibition of men's violence they will likely inspire. Considering how
few women are likely to take the risk (legal, physical, and other) of re-
sponding to violence, the larger impact of those who do, even if imper-
fect, should be tolerated.
A. Closing the Violence Gender Gap: Violence Literacy and Violence
Entitlement
If we think of violence as a resource, access to violence and to phys-
ical force generally is heavily influenced by gender. As a general rule,
men and boys have greater basic knowledge and perceptions of their
bodies as (non-sexually) physical, competitive, and defensive objects, and
173. As McCaughey notes, "because the imminence requirement fails to take into account many
of women's self-defense situations, feminist lawyers explain[:] 'The crucial point to be conveyed to the
judge and jury is that, due to a variety of societally based factors, a woman may reasonably perceive
imminent and lethal danger in a situation in which a man might not."' MCCAUGHEY, supra note 2, at
49.
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have greater access to the resources of violence.1 7 4 This is due in large
part to gender stereotypes about physical aggression, namely, the expec-
tation of women and girls to be compliant and docile, and the expecta-
tion of men and boys to be forceful and aggressive. Women are discour-
aged from aggressive physical activity by a narrow and restrictive social
conception of "femininity." "Women's aggression is treated as an unnat-
ural and distasteful transgression because aggression is a marker of sexu-
al difference, which is made meaningful in a hierarchy of social power." 75
The ability to use force is often a prerequisite for feeling entitled to
use force. In the best case scenario, being literate about violence can in-
spire a heightened sense of bodily integrity, self-respect, and self-
reliance. As the author Colette Dowling puts it, "Until women are able
to experience strength, endurance, and pleasure in their bodies, whatever
social freedom we achieve will be limited. We will withdraw from physi-
cal challenge, coddling ourselves in a misguided belief in our frailty .. .
We will live out our lives as if our bodies needed protection." 76 Martha
McCaughey echoes this sentiment in her book on women's self-defense:
"[Tihe fighting spirit... transforms the way it feels to inhabit a female
body. It changes what it means to be a woman.""' Given that women are
generally subjected to more forms of physical control than men -by the
fear of physical violence, by cultural expectations and judgments about
their appearance, by social expectations of sexual availability and objecti-
fication-it is all the more disheartening to observe that they are less
likely to have access to training and resources that might counteract
these forms of control.1 7s
One of the most lethal, and arguably thus one of the most effective,
ways of protecting oneself is through gun ownership. Guns are, at least in
theory, great equalizers: having a lethal weapon can more than make up
for differences in size, strength, and gender. But while the NRA and oth-
er gun activist groups have cynically touted guns as the (only) answer to
the victimization of women, 1 79 overwhelming evidence demonstrates that
174. See Iris Marion Young, Throwing Like a Girl, in THROWING LIKE A GIRL AND OTHER
ESSAYS IN FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL THEORY 141, 147 (1990) ("[Women] feel as though we
must have our attention directed upon our bodies to make sure they are doing what we wish them to
do, rather than paying attention to what we want to do through our bodies.").
175. MCCAUGHEY, supra note 2, at 57.
176. COLETTE DOWLING, THE FRAILTY MYTH: REDEFINING THE PHYSICAL POTENTIAL OF
WOMEN AND GIRLS (2000).
177. MCCAUGHEY, supra note 2, at 2.
178. "[Tlhe philosophy of self-defense goes beyond the individual's ability to protect herself
against attack. It goes straight to the heart of made-up femininity and of the inequality between the
sexes that the concept of gender has so insidiously supported. Physical equality . . . puts an end to
domination. This, it has become increasingly clear, is the final stage of women's liberation. By making
themselves physically equal, women can at last make themselves free." DOWLING, supra note 176, at
259.
179. For more on why NRA's solicitude towards female victims of crime is hypocritical and mis-
leading, see Mary Anne Franks, Stand Your Ground's Woman Problem: Laws Expanding Self-Defense
Raise Questions About Gender as Well as Race, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 3, 2014), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/mary-anne-franks/stand-your-grounds-woman- b_4886650.html.
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guns actually increase, rather than decrease, the odds that a woman will
be killed or injured by an abuser:
the presence of a firearm in a domestic violence situation increased
the risk of homicide by 500 percent for women . . . . [W]omen
were more than three times more likely to be murdered when there
was a gun in their household, even when domestic abuse wasn't a
factor."s
The fact that gun ownership in the U.S. is on the rise has been met
with strong feelings on both sides of the firearms debate. The stark dis-
parities of gender (as well as race) in gun ownership have received less
attention.' 1 While the gap between men and women in gun ownership
has narrowed in recent years, from five times as many men owning guns
as women several years ago, to twice as many men as women currently,'
this remaining gap is still significant. While pro-gun organizations may
treat the rise in gun ownership as an indication that upright citizens are
increasingly willing to take up arms against unsavory elements, the real
story is likely more complex. When one considers the rates of violence of
men against women, especially against intimate partners, the gender dif-
ferential is a particular cause for concern. Add to this the fact that in a
substantial number of households where a gun is present, only the men
know that it is.'"' That men often keep such vital information from their
female spouse or partner raises serious questions about the usefulness of
guns for women's self-defense.
Empirical data on gun club memberships and visits to shooting
ranges also indicate that women are significantly less likely to use guns
recreationally, or to receive as much training as men are.', There are
many problems with the suggestion that guns are the answer to violent
crime, and the exploitation of women's vulnerabilities by gun advocates
is both cynical and superficial.18 1 It is nonetheless important to note the
gender disparity in gun ownership and use, and the impact it has on the
relationships between men and women.
There is also a gender gap in activities such as martial arts training.
Men and boys are more likely to enroll in classes like karate, jiu-jitsu,
Krav Maga, and other self-defense forms that impart potentially deadly
180. Hannah Groch-Begley, Guns Make Domestic Violence Deadlier, MEDIA MATTERS FOR
AMERICA (Apr. 18,2014), http://mediamatters.org/blog/2014/04/18/guns-make-domestic-violence-dead
lier/198942.
181. With some exceptions: Anna Inge Larish, Why Annie Can't Get Her Gun: A Feminist Per-
spective on the Second Amendment, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 467 (1996).
182. Lydia Saad, Self-Reported Gun Ownership in U.S. is Highest Since 1993, GALLUP (Oct. 26,
2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/150353/Self-Reported-Gun-Ownership-Highest-1993.aspx?version=
print.
183. Jens Ludwig et al., The Gender Gap in Reporting Household Gun Ownership, 88 AM.J. PUB.
HEALTH 1715, 1717 (1998).
184. Margaret Shaw, Too Close to Home: Guns and Intimate Partner Violence, SMALL ARMS
SURVEY 2013, at 30, available at http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2013/en/
Small-Arms-Survey-2013-Chapter-2-EN.pdf.
1' See Mary Anne Franks, Facts, Not Feelings, About Guns, MOVING TARGETS (Dec. 3, 2015), http://
maryannefranks.com/post/134463540158/facts-not-feelings-about-guns.
No. 3]1 961
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
knowledge of how to use of one's body as a weapon.'" Moreover, in-
creases in women and girl's participation in martial arts has often been
accompanied by extreme sexual harassment.'? Considered in isolation,
men's greater propensity to train in martial arts may be a neutral-even
positive -phenomenon, but against the background of male violence
against women it can have more ominous implications."
Though Title IX and other efforts to encourage women and girls'
participation in sports have in many ways changed the landscape of
school athletics and professional sports organizations, men continue to
dominate the playing field.' Sport can teach important lessons about
how to relate to one's body-lessons that do not focus on how others
perceive the attractiveness or sexual availability of one's body, but rather
on skill, speed, and the joy of physical movement.'9 The fact that there
are still fewer opportunities for and less encouragement of women and
girls to participate in sports relative to men and boys means that women
and girls are missing out on meaningful and useful physical activity.
To address the gender gap in the ability and willingness to use force
to protect oneself and engage in healthy physical activity, Title IX should
be rigorously and aggressively used to ensure equal opportunities in ath-
letic training and competition. The State should subsidize social initia-
tives that seek to increase women and girls' participation in sports and
martial arts. Sexual harassment and other forms of gender discrimination
should be consistently and severely punished, and artificial divisions be-
tween men and women's sporting activities (reinforced by advertising)
should be broken down.
186. See Alex Channon, Towards the "Undoing" of Gender in Mixed-Sex Martial Arts and Com-
bat Sports, 4 SOCIETIES 587,590-91 (2014).
187. See David Mayeda, Fighting for the Right to Fight: Part III - Blatant Sexism Tolerated, THE
GRUMPY SOCIOLOGIST (Aug. 11, 2009, 12:29 AM),
http://thegrumpysociologist.blogspot.com/2009/08/fighting-for-right-to-fight-part-iii.html.
188. DALE C. SPENCER, ULTIMATE FIGHTING AND EMBODIMENT: VIOLENCE, GENDER, AND
MIXED MARTIAL ARTS 3 (2013); James MacDonald, Explaining the Growth and Popularity of Wom-
en's Mixed Martial Arts, BLEACHER REPORT (July 31, 2014),
http://bleacherreport.comlarticles/2148497-examining-the-growth-and-popularity-of-womens-mixed-
martial-arts.
189. "[W]hile Title IX has opened up the playing fields, women and girls still lag behind men and
boys in participation, resources and coaching." In 2003-2004, women made up only 43% of college and
university athletes even though they made up 57% of the student population. Female college athletes
were the recipients of only 37% of sports operating funds and 32% of recruitment funds. NAT'L COAL.
FOR WOMEN AND GIRLS IN EDUC., TITLE IX AT 35: BEYOND THE HEADLINES, at 1, 3 (2008) available
at http://www.feminist.org/educationfTitlelXat35.pdf.
190. "[T]he quest for equal opportunity in school sports has always been about the educational,
physiological, sociological and psychological benefits of sports and physical activity. Research studies
have found that girls who play sports are more confident, have higher self-esteem and better body im-
ages, are less likely to get pregnant or be involved with drugs, and are more likely to graduate from
high school than girls who do not play sports." Id. at 7.
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B. Women's Responsive Violence
In general, women drastically under-respond to the spectrum of
male aggressive behavior, from street harassment to domestic violence.
This under-response is the product of many factors, not least the cultural
taboo against women's aggression and simultaneous celebration of male
aggression. As Martha McCaughey writes: "Cultural ideals of manhood
and womanhood include a cultural, political, aesthetic, and legal ac-
ceptance of men's aggression and a deep skepticism, fear, and prohibi-
tion of women's.""9 t This double standard must change. At a minimum,
law and society must encourage women to respond proportionally and
effectively to violence and aggression by men. This requires the end to
the double standard at work in responses to men and women's respective
violence. Women who fight back with proportional force against unjusti-
fied violence should be praised, not condemned. More controversially,
law and society must tolerate even some measure of non-proportional
responses by women to unjustified violence by men. This is necessary for
two reasons. The first is that women, no less than any male victims of vio-
lence, will necessarily make some errors about the measure of force nec-
essary to counter the aggression they face. Women should be granted at
least the same accommodation given to men who make such errors. The
second, and more radical, reason is that overreaction in individual in-
stances can have a deterrent effect on unjustified violence generally. A
woman who responds to a catcaller by breaking his nose has arguably
overreacted with regard to the individual instance and the individual
perpetrator, but has arguably reacted proportionally with regard to ei-
ther her own experiences of multiple harassment on multiple occasions
by multiple individuals, and/or with regard to women's general experi-
ences of harassment. The disparity between men's and women's violence
is so great that even overreactions can sometimes be justified as potential
corrective responses necessary to dramatically shift social expectations.
Whether proportionate or justifiably disproportionate, women's forceful
responses to men's aggression should be as public and as spectacular as
possible to maximize this expressive effect. Violent men must learn to
fear women's force at least as much as they fear other men's.
That women's responsive violence be perceived as credible threat is
more important than how often such violence actually occurs. Given this,
widely broadcasting spectacular instances of women fighting back in
mainstream and social media (as occurred with many of the cases below)
of serves important goals of awareness and inhibition.
191. McCAUGHEY, supra note 2, at 3.
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1. Proportionate Responses
In this section, I consider a few examples of women's proportional
responses to male aggression in public spaces." The first two are stories
of women in the U.S. fighting back against subway sexual abusers-
individuals, nearly always men, who take advantage of crowded trains to
engage in non-consensual sexual acts from exhibitionism to groping. A
video clip of a woman named Nicola Briggs loudly berating a man who
had exposed himself to her on a New York subway train went viral in
2010.'"9 Once Briggs became aware that the man in front of her on the
train was acting suspiciously, she grabbed his messenger bag and pushed
it aside to verify what he was doing. When she realized he was mastur-
bating, Briggs proceeded to inform the man that she would be escorting
him to a police station. Because of her actions, the harasser, was arrested.
Briggs noted that many people in the train car offered to help once they
realized what was going on.
Briggs' experience was considerably more positive than that of a
Boston woman who found herself in a similar situation on that city's
subway. The woman, who has so far remained anonymous, grabbed a
man who had exposed himself and masturbated over her on the train as
he tried to exit and held him until cops arrived. She explained, "I've had
enough of being harassed on the street. I'm tired of it and I want it to
end. It was the last straw."'94 In contrast to Briggs' experience, no one
stepped in to help even after the woman shouted out what the man was
doing. It was "appalling," she said. "That makes me so angry. I want eve-
ryone to know that they have to say something. "195
Public transportation is a site for sexual harassment outside of the
U.S. a well. In 2010, a woman named Lisa Robinson made headlines for
intervening against drunken sports fans on a train in Wales. Robinson
was traveling with her husband and children when the men began ob-
scenely harassing another woman on the train. When she asked them to
stop, they turned their attention to her instead, using increasingly ob-
scene and threatening language. Robinson pulled the emergency brake
and told the conductor to call the police. The conductor merely reset the
brake and resumed the train's progress. At the next station, Robinson
and her family got off and Robinson again asked the conductor to call
the police. He again refused. At that point, Robinson "slithered down off
192. Of course there is always the danger that women will be placed at more risk by fighting back.
This is why increasing women's physical literacy and ability is key to the reallocation of violence.
There will inevitably be some tragic consequences to women fighting back against male violence, but
the tragic consequences of not fighting back are clear and unacceptable.
193. Subway Hero Nicola Briggs Steps Forward, HOLLABACK! (Nov. 5, 2010, 10:34 PM), http://
www.ihollaback.org/blog/2010/11/25/subway-hero-nicola-briggs-steps-forward/.
194. Renee Nadeau Algarin, 'She-Hulk' Collars Alleged T Creep After Lewd Act, BOSTON
HERALD.COM (Apr. 21, 2012), https://web.archive.org/web/20120423221859/http://www.bostonherald.
comlnews/regional/view/20220421she-hulkcollars allegedt-creep-after_1ewd-act/srvc=home&
position=4.
195. Id.
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the platform on to the track." She stood in front of the train to prevent it
from moving until police were called. Robinson said,
I wanted to protect both my husband and my child and I wanted
this behaviour to stop. Some of the fans got off the train and
took pictures of me with mobile phones and continued to abuse
me. This is my community, this is my village. We're not going to
be bullied and certainly for women and families, they should be
able to travel on the train in peace and quiet and go about their
business without being bullied like that.196
Men's harassment of women in India, especially sexual harassment,
is so prevalent that it has been given a unique name: "Eve-teasing." This
casual, opportunistic harassment is so common on public transportation
that women-only trains have been introduced in major cities so that
women can travel to work free of catcalls and groping hands." Men who
attempt to defy the women-only rule "can expect to be dragged by the
hair, or often grabbed by the ears and slapped around the head, and
when the train arrives at the next stop, train staff join in on the slapping
in a clear bid to humiliate the men." 9 s In addition, women in India are
enrolling in martial arts classes as a way of protecting themselves from
harassment, rape, and other forms of male violence:
In India, where we are yet to enact a stringent law guarding against
sexual harassment at the workplace and in public transport, self-
defense programs ... seem the only viable option left. Sexual at-
tacks occur mostly on public transport like buses, trains and auto
rickshaws where men pray [sic] on women from close proximity.
Martial arts techniques of close combat like elbow jabs and chin
punches are proving very effective in getting the offender to lay off.
A temple punch is enough to knock a man unconscious. Here,
women are taught to deliver kicks and punches with force and pre-
cision when it is most needed.'9
An extraordinary video of one woman's response to Eve-teasing
drew international attention some years ago. In the video, a tall, armed
soldier comes out of a shop, chased by a diminutive woman who informs
all who can hear that this soldier has just groped her. The woman, Rali
Faihriem, pursues the soldier down the street, picking up heavy stones
and heaving them at him, striking him several times.20
196. Woman on Track Halts Train After Cardiff Fans' Abuse, BBC NEWS WALES (Oct. 5, 2010),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-11474308.
197. Julie McCarthy, On India's Trains, Seeking Safety in the Women's Compartment, NPR (Mar.
28, 2013), http://www.npr.org/2013/03/28/175471907/on-indias-trains-seeking-safety-in-the-women-s-
compartment.
198. Key Hedges, Indian Women Slapping Men Who Ride on Women-Only Carriages, DIGITAL
JOURNAL (Nov. 29, 2010), http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/300833.
199. Lesley D. Biswas, Forget Pepper Spray: Indian Women Use Martial Arts to Protect Them-
selves, ALTERNET (Jan. 9, 2009), http://www.alternet.org/story/117524/forget-pepper spray%3A
indianwomenusemartial-arts-to-protect themselves.
200. Mandy Van Deven, Woman in Assam Stones Eve Teaser, BITCHMEDIA (Aug. 2, 2009, 4:38
AM), http:/Ibitchmagazine.org/post/woman-in-assam-stones-eve-teaser.
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These examples of proportional, justified responses to male aggres-
sion should be praised and widely shared. We should create legal and so-
cial norms that encourage women to develop the confidence and the
training to defend themselves, not only for the benefits gained in individ-
ual situations, but also in order to communicate the larger social message
that women are can and will fight back.
2. Disproportionate Responses
In the category of what might be called "disproportionate" respons-
es to male violence, let us consider the following examples. In 2012, a
woman in Turkey who had allegedly been raped and impregnated by a
man in her village shot him in the head and the genitals when he re-
turned to her home to rape her once more. The woman, Nevin Yildirim,
then cut off the man's head and carried it into the town square. "'Don't
talk behind my back, don't play with my honor,' Yildirim said to the men
sitting in the coffee house on the square. 'Here is the head of the man
who played with my honor. "'201
Phoolan Devi, known as India's "Bandit Queen," became famous in
the 1980s for her participation in crime sprees with her partner, Vikram
Mallah. Mallah was a low-caste villager who had taken over a prominent
gang after shooting its former upper-caste leader dead for raping Devi.
Eventually Mallah was assassinated by former members of the gang who
objected to his lower-class status. These former gang members captured
Devi and subjected her to gang rape and humiliation over several days,
finally forcing her to walk naked around the village of Behmai. Devi
managed to escape, and several months later she returned to Behmai,
megaphone and gun in hand. She called out for the villagers to hand over
the two gang members who had orchestrated her abduction and gang
rape. "'If you don't hand them over to me, I will stick my gun into your
butts and tear them apart. This is Phoolan Dev (sic) speaking'. .. The
two men could not be found. And so Devi rounded up all the young men
in the village and stood them in a line before a well. They were then
marched in single file to the river. At a green embankment they were or-
dered to kneel. There was a burst of gunfire and twenty-two men lay
dead."202
In 2013, media reports began to circulate about a blonde woman
"hunting" bus drivers in Juarez, Mexico in retaliation for the hundreds of
mostly unsolved rapes and murders of women in the city.203 After two bus
201. Talia Kayali, Turkish Woman Awaits Trial After Beheading Her Alleged Rapist, CNN (Sept.
6, 2012, 9:21 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/05/world/europe/turkey-rape-beheading/.
202. Luke Harding, The Queen is Dead, THE GUARDIAN (July 26, 2001), http://www.theguardian.
com/g2/story/0,3604,527406,00.html. Devi went on to become a Member of Parliament, and was shot
dead by three masked gunmen in 2001. Id.
203. See Yuri Herrera, Diana, Hunter of Bus Drivers, THIS AMERICAN LIFE, http://www.this
americanlife.org/diana-hunter-of-bus-drivers/ (last visited May 28, 2016) ("[T]he number of women
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drivers were murdered in similar styles within twenty-four hours of each
other in Juarez, someone calling herself "Diana the Hunter" sent an
email to a news website claiming responsibility for the killings. The email
read:
You think that because we are women we are weak, and that may
be true but only up to a point, because even though we have no-
body to defend us and we have to work long hours until late into
the night to earn a living for our families we can no longer be silent
in the face of these acts that enrage us. We were victims of sexual
violence from bus drivers working the maquila night shifts here in
Judrez, and although a lot of people know about the things we've
suffered, nobody defends us nor does anything to protect us. That's
why I am an instrument that will take revenge for many women.
For we are seen as weak, but in reality we are not. We are brave.
And if we don't get respect, we will earn that respect with our own
hands. We the women of Judrez are strongTM
Some of the women raped and killed in Juarez had been assaulted
by bus drivers, though there was "no evidence that the bus drivers who
were killed by the blonde woman had actually committed a crime at
all." 205 A reporter for This American Life observed the following ex-
change between a bus driver and a female passenger while riding on the
bus route on which the killings had taken place:
"What, are you Diana the Hunter?"
"No, of course not," she replied. "What, are you afraid of me now?"
"Well yeah," he replied. "Shouldn't I be?"2a
These acts of violence are troubling given ambiguous details and seeming
lack of due process afforded to the men on the receiving end. Without
praising such acts, it is important to recognize that they are partly a
product of legitimate frustration with a legal and cultural status quo that
thoroughly fails female victims of male violence. These acts should serve
as warning signs that a given criminal justice system is broken and must
be reformed to adequately address the concerns of women and girls who
suffer from men's violence. The structural inequality of violence should
be taken into account when assessing acts of this nature, including the
potential for such excessive or unjust violence to serve a beneficial pur-
pose in a distributional, though not individual, sense.
many women it was hard to count accurately. In 2010, the number peaked: at least 304 women were
murdered that year.").
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VI. CONCLUSION
In Politics as Vocation, Max Weber writes,
the state is a relation of men dominating men, a relation sup-
ported by means of legitimate (i.e. considered to be legitimate)
violence. If the state is to exist, the dominated must obey the au-
thority claimed by the powers that be. When and why do men
obey? Upon what inner justifications and upon what external
means does this domination rest?207
The use of the word "men" in this passage is both misleading and illumi-
nating. In the original German, Weber used the word "Menschen,"
which was translated to English as "men." In German, "Menschen" does
not mean men as such, but rather "people." The English translation is
not inaccurate, however, because the word "men" is presumably used
here in the sense of "mankind," ostensibly referring to all of humanity.
The term "men" can be universal, encompassing both men and women;
the term "women" is hopelessly particular and can never be used to refer
to the universal human race.2" This linguistic convention reveals much
about English-speaking society's view of women; often, as here, it also
inadvertently highlights how fundamental beliefs about society are thor-
oughly gendered.29 Taken literally, "men dominating men" is actually an
extremely apt characterization of the State's use and legitimation of vio-
lence. Men make, justify, and obey (or not) the rules for other men;
women are not part of the process at all. They are simply acted upon.
This radically unjust state of affairs must be disrupted. At a mini-
mum, law and society should promote women's proportional responses
to unjustified male violence. Encouraging women and girls' competence
and confidence in using physical force is an important aspect of this goal.
While this shift in norms may sometimes result in disproportionate force,
this is a cost the law should absorb. Society and law has long accommo-
dated men's "reasonable error" when using deadly force; it should make
at least as much room for women's. Law and society should moreover
tolerate some degree of disproportionate violence by women against
men, given that extreme force may be necessary to reset longstanding so-
cial and legal defaults. As disturbing as disproportionate violence may be
on an individual level, such violence can nonetheless be beneficial in
terms of its aggregate impact on the suboptimal allocation of violence be-
tween men and women. If an increase in women's use of violence against
men will result in more equitable and efficient distribution of violence
between the genders, it should be tolerated and even encouraged.
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